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MOST CANADIANS VIEW 
POLICE FAVOURABLY
According to an Angus Reid Institute study released 
in October 2020, the vast majority of Canadians 
perceive the police in their own community 
favourably. In the survey, respondents were asked 
whether they generally viewed the police in their 
own community where they lived as favourably or 
unfavourably. According to the report, 75%  of 
Canadians viewed their local police favourably, 
while 21%  did not. The remaining respondents 
were not sure or did not know. 
Police Viewed Favourably by Region
Newfoundland and Labrador had the highest 
proportion of residents with a favourable view of 
police followed by Saskatchewan, Alberta and 
Manitoba.
Police Viewed Favourably by Major City
Favourably Factors
Looking at various respondent groups, the 
following were more likely to favourably view their 
local police:
• Females (77%) v. Males (72%)
• 55+ years of age (85%) v. 35-54 years (76%)
or 18-34 years (59%
• $100K income (78%) v. $50K-<$100K
income (77%) or <$50K income (67%)
• College educated (76%) v. High school or
less educated (74%), or University educated
(73%).
• Conservative voter (84%) v. Bloc voter
(80%), Liberal voter (75%), Green voter (62%)
or NDP voter (61%).
• Caucasian (77%) v. Indigenous (72%) or other
visible minority (67%).
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Regina 84% 16% 1%
Calgary 79% 16% 5%
Edmonton 79% 19% 2%
Saskatoon 75% 19% 5%
Quebec City 74% 22% 4%
Halifax 72% 28% 3%
Winnipeg 70% 26% 4%
Vancouver 69% 27% 4%
Greater Toronto Area 69% 24% 7%
Montreal 67% 29% 4%
Net: Favourably
See more on p. 5
Volume 20 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2020
PAGE 2
National Library of Canada 
Cataloguing in Publication 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)  
  Monthly
  Title from caption.
  “A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia.”
       ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. 
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada - 
Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In 
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
Highlights In This Issue
CBSA Seizures 4
BC IIO Notifications Up From The Previous Year 7
In The Circumstances, Reasonable To Believe 
Passenger Possessed Stolen Auto
10
Exigent Circumstances Belief Must Be More Than 
Vague Concern
14
Crown Must Justify Continuing With Sealing Order 17
Court Split On Legality Of Strip Search 21
RCMP Release Final Report On Strip Searches 25
s. 10(b) Charter Breach By Not Following-Up With 
Detainee When Lawyer Of Choice Not Available
27
Informer Information: How Compelling, Credible & 
Corroborated Is It?
28
No Standing To Argue s. 8 Charter Breach In 
Abandoned Machine Shop
32
Police Lawfully In Residence: No Feeney Warrant 
Required For Arrest
34
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Be ready for anything: how to survive tornadoes, 
earthquakes, pandemics, mass shootings, nuclear 
disasters, and other life-threatening events. 
Daisy Luther.
New York, NY: Racehorse Publishing, 2019.
GF 86 L883 2019
Conflict management for managers: resolving 
workplace, client, and policy disputes.
Susan S. Raines.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020.
HD 42 R35 2020
Creating a drama-free workplace: the insider's 
guide to managing conflict, incivility & mistrust.
Anna Maravelas.
Newburyport, MA: Career Press, 2020.
HD 42 M375 2019
Dealing with difficult people: fast, effective 
strategies for handling problem people.
Roy Lilley.
London, UK; New York, NY: Kogan Page Ltd., 2019.
HF 5548.8 L493 2019
Dark side of media and technology: a 21st 
century guide to media and technological literacy.
Edward Downs, editor.
New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2019.
P 95.54 D37 2019
Evidence-informed learning design: creating 
training to improve performance.
Mirjam Neelen & Paul A. Kirschner.
London, UK: Kogan Page Ltd., 2020.
HF 5549.5 T7 N398 2020
Fear is fuel: the surprising power to help you find 
purpose, passion, and performance.
Patrick Sweeney.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020.
BF 637 S8 S94 2020
Interpreting qualitative data. 
David Silverman.
London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications 
Ltd., 2020.
HM 571 S53 2020
Interviewing as qualitative research: a guide for 
researchers in education and the social sciences. 
Irving Seidman.
New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2019.
H 61.28 S45 2019
An introduction to qualitative research.
Uwe Flick.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2018.
BF 76.5 F55 2018
Lawless: the secret rules that govern our digital 
lives.
Nicolas P. Suzor.
Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019.
K 564 C6 S875 2019
Managing privacy in a connected world.
Éloïse Gratton & Elisa Henry.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2020.
KE 1242 C6 G73 2020
The power of strategic listening. 
Laurie Lewis.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2020.
HD 30.3 L495 2020
Single-session coaching and one-at-a-time 
coaching: distinctive features.
Windy Dryden.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2020.
BF 637 P36 D79 2020
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CBSA SEIZURES
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) released its 
seizure statistics for the 2019-2020 fiscal year 
(posted May 29, 2020). The fiscal year begins on 
April 1 and ends on March 31 the following year. 
DRUGS
Cannabis products includes dried and fresh 
cannabis, cannabis seeds, resin, solids, non-solids, 
concentrates and synthetic cannabis.
Cocaine/crack includes coca leaves, coca paste, 
cocaine and cocaine crack.
Firearms include non-restricted, restricted, and 
prohibited firearms.
Cannabis Products 
Grams 4,322,136
Cocaine/Crack
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
1,429,465 grams 1,304,903 grams -9%
Heroin
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
119,884 grams 178,306 grams +49%
Fentanyl
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
5,166 grams 2,951 grams -43%
Firearms
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
696 753 +8%
Prohibited Weapons
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
22,264 18,966 -15%
Child Pornography
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
227 295 +30%
Currency
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
$32,899,456 $27,493,051 -16%
Suspected Proceeds of Crime
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
$2,808,831 $3,527,776 +26%
Alcohol
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
22,070 litres 14,209 litres -36%
Tobacco
2018/2019 2019/2020
Cartons 14,560 10,618
Kg 161,384 173,391
Jewelry
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
6,839 seizures 15,142 seizures +121%
Total Seizures
2018/2019 2019/2020 Change
30,689 47,765 +56%
Hashish
Grams 24,370
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Most Interactions With Police Positive
For respondents having at least one direct 
interaction with police in the last five years, most 
rated their overall experience with police as 
positive when asked to think about the officer(s) 
demeanour and the way the person was treated. An 
interaction was described as “anything from a 
traffic stop, to speeding  ticket, to reporting a break 
in or disturbance.”
The net positivity of police/citizen encounters 
varied across provinces. 
Positivity Factors
Looking at various respondent groups, the 
following were more likely  to view their 
interactions with police as positive:
• Females (81%) v. Males (79%)
• 55+ years of age (84%) v. 35-54 years (79%) 
or 18-34 years (74%)
• $100K income (83%) v. $50K-<$100K 
income (81%) or <$50K income (71%)
• Col lege educated and Univers i t y 
educated (80%) v. High school or less 
educated (77%)
• Conservative voter (86%) v. Liberal voter 
(79%), Bloc voter (78%), NDP voter (71%) or 
Green voter (70%).
• Caucasian (81%) v. visible minority (76%) or 
Indigenous (72%).
Most Canadians Proud of Their Police
When asked, the  overwhelming majority of 
Canadian residents agreed the police in their 
community made them proud. In total, 72% of 
respondents said they strongly  or moderately 
agreed they were proud of their police while 28% 
did not.
The poll also divided respondents into four (4) 
groups based on their perspective of police:
• True Blue - 26% of population
• Silent Supporters - 26% of population
• Ambivalent Observers - 22% of population 
• Defunders - 25% of population
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Region Net
Positive
Net
Negative
British Columbia 78% 22%
Alberta 84% 16%
Saskatchewan 86% 14%
Manitoba 83% 17%
Ontario 78% 22%
Quebec 76% 24%
New Brunswick 79% 21%
Nova Scotia 83% 17%
Newfoundland and Labrador 84% 16%
Police in community make me proud.
Policing Perspective Net
Agree
Net
Disagree
True Blue 97% 3%
Silent Supporters 90% 10%
Ambivalent Observers 73% 27%
Defunders 28% 72%
Total 72% 28%
See full survey for more results.
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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BC IIO NOTIFICATIONS UP 
FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR
In its Annual Report 2019-2020, the IIO described 
itself as follows:
The IIO is a civilian-led, police oversight 
agency which was created in 2012. At its helm 
is a Chief Civilian Director (CCD) who is, by 
statute, not permitted to have ever been a 
police officer. The IIO is responsible for 
conducting investigations into incidents of 
death or serious harm that may have been the 
result of the actions or inactions of a police 
officer, whether on- or off-duty. The IIO is 
responsible for investigating these incidents 
throughout the province of B.C. 
The IIO has jurisdiction over all of B.C.’s 
policing agencies. This includes 11 municipal 
agencies, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), the South Coast BC Transportation 
Authority Police Service, and the Stl’atl’imx 
Tribal Police Service. Our jurisdiction includes 
officers appointed as special provincial 
constables, municipal constables, and on- and 
off- duty police officers. The IIO’s authority 
comes from the British Columbia Police Act, 
which requires the police to notify the IIO of an 
incident that may fall within its jurisdiction. 
An investigation commences whenever there 
has been serious harm or death. There does not 
need to be an allegation of wrongdoing. All 
investigations are carried out in as transparent a 
manner as is practical under the circumstances, 
while respect ing the integr i ty of the 
investigation and the privacy interests of those 
involved. The IIO conducts all investigations to 
a criminal law standard. 
According to its Annual Report, the IIO received 
242 incident notifications that potentially involved 
serious harm or death arising from the action or 
inaction of police for the fiscal period from April 1, 
2019 to March 31, 2020. Of these 242 
notifications, 49 were categorized as advice files 
while 193 were  investigated. Of the  193 
investigations, 106 files were concluded without a 
public report or media release, 41 files were  closed 
with a public report, eight (8) files were concluded 
with a media release, six (6) files were referred to 
Crown Counsel and 36  files remained under active 
investigation. 
Of the 193 investigations opened:
• 132 originated from an RCMP detachment, 60 
from a municipal police agency and one (1) 
from the Stl’atl’imx Tribal Police Service.
• 156 notifications to the  IIO occurred within 24 
hours of the  incident taking place. Of these 
notifications, 28 were made within one hour of 
the incident. The remaining 37  notifications 
occurred after 24 hours. 
AFFECTED PERSONS 
Individuals who died or suffered serious injuries as a result of an interaction with BC police.
Ages 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Total
Male 11 8 29 34 20 13 13 16 9 0 153
Female 1 3 4 2 4 4 5 2 2 2 29
Total 12 11 33 36 24 17 18 18 11 2 182
Note: The IIO’s Annual Report 2019-2020 identified 167 affected persons as male and 29 as female. This totals 193 affected 
persons. However, the IIO table provided at p. 16 of its annual report identified only 182 affected persons by age categories.
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“Serious harm” is defined “as injury that may 
result in death, may cause serious disfigurement, or 
may cause substantial loss or impairment of 
mobility of the body as a whole or of the function 
of any limb or organ.” 
The “medical” classification “includes instances 
where  the primary reason for the death or serious 
harm of the affected person is attributed to a health 
condition confirmed by a medical professional 
during the course of an IIO investigation.”
The “other” classification “involve circumstances 
that are not well-aligned with the larger 
classification groups identified or may include 
elements that fit under multiple categories.” 
The “self-inflicted” classification “includes 
serious harm or death that may have been related 
to drug use by the affected person before or during 
their police interaction, suicides and suicide 
attempts, or other actions taken by the affected 
person, often in an attempt to avoid arrest” such as 
“an affected person [jumping] from some height 
while attempting to flee officers.”
Crown Counsel Referrals
Of the six (6) cases referred to Crown Counsel in 
fiscal 2019-2020, charges were approved in four 
(4) cases while the remaining two (2) were pending 
a decision as of March 31, 2020. 
IIO Notifications
Notifications to the  IIO were up 37% over the 
previous fiscal year.
FILES BY CLASSIFICATION
Classification Death Serious Harm Total
CEW (Conducted Energy Weapon) 0 2 2
Firearm 3 3 6
In Custody 2 4 6
Medical 7 6 13
MVI (Motor Vehicle Incident) 5 28 33
PSD (Police Service Dog) 0 14 14
Self-Inflicted 27 24 51
Use of Force 3 42 45
Other 11 12 23
Total 58 135 193
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IIO STATS
POLICE FORCE
Abbotsford 7
New Westminster 2
Central Saanich 2
Port Moody 2
Saanich 1
Vancouver 31
Victoria 13
West Vancouver 1
Municipal Total 59
RCMP 131
Stl’atl’imx Tribal Police 1
Lower Mainland District 1
Southeast Traffic District 1
Total 193
INVESTIGATIONS BY RCMP DETACHMENT
100 Mile House 1 North Vancouver 4
Boundary-Midway 1 Penticton 4
Burnaby 2 Port Alberni 2
Campbell River 3 Prince George 8
Chase 1 Prince Rupert 2
Chilliwack 7 Richmond 2
Chilliwack (UFV Traffic) 1 Ridge Meadows 3
Clinton 1 Salmon Arm 3
Coquitlam 4 Sicamous 1
Dawson Creek 1 Sidney/North Saanich 1
Fort St. James 2 Smithers 1
Fort St. John 3 Sooke 1
Hope 2 Squamish 1
Kamloops 6 Sunshine Coast 3
Kelowna 6 Surrey 17
Langley 6 Terrace 2
Lytton 1 Trail 1
Merritt 1 University 2
Nanaimo 5 Vanderhoof 1
New Hazelton 1 West Shore 8
North Cowichan/Duncan 2 Whistler 4
North Okanagan/Vernon 3 TOTAL 131
Note: The IIO table at p. 31 of its annual report identified Port 
Moody Department as an RCMP agency. Port Moody Department, 
however, is a municipal agency and has been referenced in the 
above tables as such. Thus, numbers differ in the above table.
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IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
REASONABLE TO BELIEVE 
PASSENGER POSSESSED STOLEN 
AUTO
R. v. Harms, 2020 BCCA 242
At about 7:25 a.m., a 2014 Toyota 
Corolla was stolen after its owner left 
it running outside her residence with 
its keys in the ignition. She reported 
the theft to police and the vehicle 
was located by an officer parked on a street at 
10:50 a.m. Several anti-auto theft team members 
established surveillance  on the vehicle. At 11:13 
a.m., the accused and another man, whom the 
police recognized as having been previously 
arrested in another anti-auto theft project, 
approached and entered the stolen vehicle. The 
accused was the passenger while  the other man 
was the driver. They drove  around for about a half 
hour, then parked in a back alley, exited the vehicle 
and briefly split up. A few minutes later they met 
up again on foot at a nearby intersection. The men 
were then arrested for possessing the  stolen vehicle. 
Following his arrest, the accused was searched. In 
his pants’ pocket police found two shotgun shells, 
and a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun and stolen 
licence plates were located in his backpack. He 
was charged with possessing the stolen vehicle  and 
the stolen licence plates, along with several 
firearms offences. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
Several police officers involved in the 
surveillance were called as witnesses. 
The arresting officer testified that he 
arrested the accused based on the 
following factors:
1. He knew the vehicle had been stolen and had 
a reasonable belief that it had been parked in 
an alleyway a couple of blocks away;
2. He had received multiple descriptions of the 
driver and passenger of the vehicle via radio. 
This description was consistent with the 
appearance of the individuals he observed; 
3. One of the  surveillance officers had advised 
that the driver and passenger had split up after 
exiting the vehicle and the arresting officer 
found it unusual that they converged a few 
moments later;
4. The arresting officer was parked in a residential 
neighbourhood and there were not a lot of 
people around at that time; and
5. The arresting officer believed, based on his 
experience and his knowledge of the driver’s 
criminal history, that the  passenger in the 
vehicle knew that it was stolen.
The accused accepted that the arresting officer 
subjectively believed he had sufficient grounds for 
the arrest. However, he argued the officer’s belief 
was not objectively reasonable since the offence  of 
possessing stolen property requires both knowledge 
and control. As for knowledge, the accused 
submitted that the keys were in the ignition and 
there  was no damage. Therefore, it was not obvious 
that a passenger would know the  vehicle was 
stolen. As for the element of control, he suggested 
that “[t]he passenger in a motor vehicle ... cannot 
be said .... to have had care and control of that 
motor vehicle.” 
The judge noted that the police observed the 
vehicle and its occupants several times over the 
course  of 20 to 30 minutes after it went mobile. The 
arresting officer also had about 12 years of police 
experience. The arresting officer’s belief that the 
accused, as a passenger in the vehicle, unlawfully 
possessed it was objectively reasonable. The judge 
stated:
[The accused] argues that it was unreasonable 
for [the arresting officer] to assume that [the 
accused] knew that he was a passenger in a 
vehicle which had been stolen. The principal 
evidence [the accused] points to in support of 
this argument is the fact that the vehicle did not 
display any signs of forced entry and was being 
driven using keys. As I understand the 
argument, [the accused] asserts that given that 
[the arresting officer] knew that the vehicle was 
stolen with keys in place, it was unreasonable 
for him to assume or infer that [the accused] 
knew the vehicle was stolen and, for that 
reason, considered through the lens of a 
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similarly experienced officer, should not have 
determined that he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest.
I reject this argument. Given the close timing 
between the theft of the vehicle and the time 
that [the accused] was first observed in it, that 
[the accused] and [the driver] appear to have 
abandoned the vehicle in a back alleyway, then 
split up only to rejoin a few blocks later, which 
as the Crown suggests may indicate a degree of 
coordination and cooperation between them, 
also given [the arresting officer’s] knowledge of 
[the driver’s] criminal background, I consider 
that it was reasonable of [the arresting officer] 
to infer that [the accused] had knowledge that 
the vehicle had been stolen.
The judge rejected the assertion that the accused’s 
ss.  8 and 9 Charter rights had been breached in 
relation his warrantless arrest and incidental search. 
The search incidental to arrest was reasonable and 
the evidence was admitted. The accused was 
convicted of possessing a stolen vehicle, possessing 
stolen licence plates, and several firearm related 
offences. He was sentenced to six years 
imprisonment less credit for time served, plus 
additional ancillary orders. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that 
t h e t r i a l j u d g e e r r e d i n 
concluding that the arresting 
officer had sufficient grounds to 
arrest him. He submitted that the officer did not 
have the necessary subjective belief that he had 
committed the offence of possessing stolen 
property. As well, the accused suggested that there 
was no reasonable basis for the officer to believe 
that he knew the vehicle was stolen nor had the 
requisite measure of control over it to possess it. 
Thus, his arrest was unlawful and the incidental 
search was unreasonable. In the accused’s view, the 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2) of the Charter, his convictions set aside and a 
new trial ordered.
The Court of Appeal first reviewed the offence of 
possessing stolen property  (s. 354(1) Criminal 
Code), aiding or abetting (s. 21 Criminal Code) and 
the definition of “possession” (s. 4(3) Criminal 
Code). “[Section]  4(3) of the Criminal Code 
contemplates three distinct types of possession: 
“personal possession”, s.  4(3)(a); “constructive 
possession”, s.  4(3)(a)(i) and (ii); and “joint 
possession”, s.  4(3)(b),” said Justice Dickson 
speaking for the Court of Appeal. “The essential 
elements of joint possession are knowledge and 
consent. Where both knowledge and consent are 
established, possession is deemed under s. 4(3)(b). 
However, to establish consent the co-existence of a 
measure of control over the property is required.”  
Lawful Arrest?
As for the law of arrest, Justice Dickson, speaking 
for the unanimous Court of Appeal, stated the 
following: 
Pursuant to s.  495(1) of the Criminal Code, a 
peace officer has authority to arrest without 
warrant a person who has committed an 
indictable offence, who, on reasonable 
grounds, the officer believes has committed or 
is about to commit an indictable offence or 
whom the officer finds committing a criminal 
offence. ...
An arresting officer must subjectively believe 
that there are reasonable grounds upon which 
to base an arrest, and those grounds must be 
objectively reasonable. The officer’s subjective 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant
s. 495(1) A peace officer may arrest 
without warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a 
criminal offence;  ...
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belief is what he or she personally believed at 
the time of the arrest and must include an 
honest belief that he or she has reasonable 
grounds to believe an offence has been 
committed, not mere suspicion. In assessing 
whether the grounds for arrest are objectively 
reasonable, the court considers the officer’s 
observations through the lens of someone with 
the same experience, training, knowledge and 
skills and decides whether a reasonable person 
with the same lens would come to the same 
conclusion.
[...]
The standard applied by the court in assessing 
the grounds for a warrantless arrest is one of 
reasonable probability or credibly-based 
probability that an indictable offence has been 
committed. This standard is less than the 
criminal and civil standards of proof, but more 
than mere suspicion. It envisions a “practical, 
non-technical and common sense probability” 
as to the existence of the salient facts and 
inferences in question.
In assessing whether the grounds for arrest 
amount to a reasonable probability that an 
offence has been committed, the court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Reasonable grounds may be based on indirect 
evidence, partial information and reasonable 
inference drawn from personal observation or 
information provided by others and the key 
question is whether the officer’s belief was 
reasonable at the time of arrest, not whether, in 
hindsight, it turns out to have been accurate. In 
conducting the assessment, the court should 
not examine the evidence in isolation or a 
piecemeal fashion. It should also be recalled 
that ... a decision to arrest may have been made 
quickly, based on available information which 
may be less than exact or complete.
Often, more than one officer will be involved 
in the events that lead up to an arrest without 
warrant. In such circumstances, the court is not 
limited to considering the observations, 
knowledge and testimony of the arresting 
officer, although the focus is on the officer who 
decided to effect the arrest and what that officer 
knew when the decision was made. To the 
extent that other officers may provide evidence 
regarding their knowledge and participation in 
the salient events, that evidence only relates to 
the grounds for arrest if it was communicated 
or otherwise known by the officer who effected 
the arrest. [references omitted, paras. 40-45]
Subjective Belief
Although it was conceded at trial that the  arresting 
officer had the  necessary subjective belief, on 
appeal the accused contended that the  officer 
failed to turn his mind to the issue  of control which 
undermined his subjective belief. The accused 
asserted that the arresting  officer , at most, only had 
a mere suspicion that he was in unlawful 
possession of the vehicle. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed because the arresting officer testified, “I 
felt that I had the grounds — reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that these two males 
were arrestable for possession of stolen property.” 
And there was evidence that the officer honestly 
believed at the time of the arrest he had reasonable 
grounds to believe the vehicle’s occupants, acting 
together in a joint venture, had committed the 
offence of possessing stolen property. Thus, the 
arresting officer had the necessary subjective belief.
“An arresting officer must subjectively believe that there are reasonable grounds 
upon which to base an arrest, and those grounds must be objectively reasonable. 
The officer’s subjective belief is what he or she personally believed at the time of 
the arrest and must include an honest belief that he or she has reasonable grounds 
to believe an offence has been committed, not mere suspicion. In assessing 
whether the grounds for arrest are objectively reasonable, the court considers the 
officer’s observations through the lens of someone with the same experience, 
training, knowledge and skills and decides whether a reasonable person with the 
same lens would come to the same conclusion.”
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Objective Grounds
The accused also argued that the trial judge erred 
in concluding that the arresting officer’s grounds to 
arrest were objectively reasonable. He attacked the 
five factors noted by the trial judge as supporting 
reasonable grounds and submitted none of them 
could support a reasonable belief that he had a 
measure of control over the  stolen vehicle. Again, 
however, the Court of Appeal disagreed. Justice 
Dickson wrote:
In my view, the judge did not err in finding that 
[the arresting officer] had objectively 
reasonable grounds to arrest [the accused] for 
committing the offence of possession of stolen 
property based on the totality of the 
circumstances. As he determined, those 
grounds were objectively reasonable taking 
into account the cumulative effect of [the 
arresting officer’s] own knowledge, experience 
and observations, including the information he 
received via police radio “on an ongoing basis” 
throughout the surveillance operation. ... [para. 
55]
And further:
The judge’s finding that the circumstances 
could indicate “a degree of coordination and 
cooperation between” [the occupants] did not 
ignore, alter or supplement [the arresting 
officer’s] testimony, nor did it amount to a 
determination of what, in hindsight, he might 
have believed when he arrested [the accused] 
for possession of stolen property. Rather, it 
distilled the overall import of [the arresting 
officer’s] testimony in the context of a 
determination on whether he had reasonable 
grounds to effect the arrest. When he was asked 
why he arrested [the accused], the import of 
[the arresting officer’s] testimony was that he 
believed [the accused’s companion], a known 
auto thief, was the driver of the recently stolen 
vehicle, that [the accused] was the passenger 
and that, given their joint presence in the 
vehicle and seemingly coordinated actions in 
abandoning it in the alley, separating and 
converging within a block or two, there was a 
“good probability” they both knew it was stolen 
and together may have stolen it. In other words, 
the overall import of [the arresting officer’s] 
testimony was that he believed [the men] were 
engaged in a joint venture knowingly to possess 
the recently stolen vehicle. While the driver ... 
had physical control, on that view its legal 
possession was shared.
In my view, assessed through the lens of an 
experienced officer, there was an objectively 
reasonable p robabi l i t y in a l l o f the 
circumstances, viewed cumulatively, that [the 
accused and his companion] had together 
committed the continuing offence of unlawfully 
possessing the stolen vehicle prior to its 
abandonment in the alley. This was so 
regardless of whether [the accused] was 
apparently in joint possession of the vehicle 
with [its driver] as a joint-venturer and co-
principal or whether, as an apparently 
voluntary passenger, he encouraged and thus 
abetted [its driver] in his unlawful possession of 
the vehicle... . [reference omitted, paras. 57-58]
The judge did not err in concluding that the 
arresting officer had reasonable  grounds to arrest 
the accused for unlawfully possessing the stolen 
vehicle based on the totality  of the  circumstances . 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Harms, 2018 BCSC 1599.
“The standard applied by the court in assessing the grounds for a warrantless 
arrest is one of reasonable probability or credibly-based probability that an 
indictable offence has been committed. This standard is less than the criminal and 
civil standards of proof, but more than mere suspicion. It envisions a ‘practical, 
non-technical and common sense probability’ as to the existence of the salient 
facts and inferences in question.”
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
BELIEF MUST BE MORE THAN  
VAGUE CONCERN
R. v. Pawar, 2020 BCCA 251
The police received a tip from a 
confidential  informer that someone 
matching the accused’s  description 
was trafficking in cocaine and heroin. 
The police surveilled  the accused 
and observed transactions and behaviours believed 
to be consistent with a dial-a-dope  operation. 
Police then saw a woman speaking to the accused 
through the passenger-side window of his car in a 
bank parking lot, run to and access an ATM in the 
bank vestibule and return to his vehicle. The 
accused and the woman were then arrested. On a 
search incidental to arrest, police found a 
small quantity of cocaine on the accused and his 
cellphone was seized. 
Following the arrests, but before the police applied 
for a warrant to search the accused’s home, they 
attended at his residence, a location they knew he 
shared with his parents and his brother. The officer-
in-charge of the investigation, relying on s. 11(7) of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (exigent 
circumstances), authorized entry into the 
residence. He feared evidence could be destroyed 
or moved before the search warrant was obtained. 
The officer-in-charge believed that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless  entry 
because:
(1) the accused’s mother was in the residence at 
the time of the arrest; 
(2) the arrest took place in a public  area of the 
downtown  core and a witness to it could 
potentially  alert  the  occupants of the house 
and direct them to move or destroy evidence; 
and 
(3) he was concerned the accused was trying to 
contact his family  members to instruct them 
to move or destroy  evidence based on 
information that the accused said his mother 
was not home and he had asked to 
contact  his  mother  or  brother to get the 
name of a lawyer. 
Police knocked on the door and the accused’s 
mother answered it. She was instructed to leave the 
residence, along with the accused’s brother, until a 
warrant was obtained and executed. Police entered 
the residence and cleared it, taking about eight 
minutes to do so. Police then vacated the residence 
and waited outside until the search warrant arrived. 
When the warrant was executed, police found a 
substantial amount of drugs valued at $120,000 on 
the street. 
British Columbia Supreme Court 
The judge concluded that the officer-in-
charge subjectively believed that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless 
entry  on the basis of a need to preserve 
the evidence. However, the judge found the 
officer’s subjective belief was not objectively 
reasonable. Thus, no exigent circumstances existed 
to justify the conduct of the police. The 
warrantless  entry of the  dwelling-house infringed 
the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter. 
However, the judge admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2). Among other things, she found the officer-in-
charge acted in good faith by relying on the 
exigent circumstances doctrine, which mitigated 
the seriousness of the Charter breach. In her view, 
the officer had “a reasonable concern that 
evidence might be moved or destroyed”  and “he 
honestly believed that he was acting lawfully in 
directing officers to enter the residence”. Taking 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 11(7) Controlled Drugs & Substances Act 
Where warrant not necessary
s. 11(7) A peace officer may exercise 
any of the powers described in 
subsection (1), (5) or (6) without a 
warrant if the conditions for obtaining a 
warrant exist but by reason of exigent circumstances 
it would be impracticable to obtain one.
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steps to remove the  accused’s mother and brother 
from the residence was not unreasonable. The 
accused was convicted of four counts of possessing 
a controlled substance —  cocaine, MDMA, 
psilocybin and marihuana — for the purpose of 
trafficking.  
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
Th e a c c u s e d a r g u e d t h e 
evidence ought to have been 
excluded. He asserted, among 
other things, that the officer-in-
charge did not act in good faith and therefore the 
trial judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the 
Charter breach was flawed. 
Good Faith?
A finding of good faith can mitigate the seriousness 
of a Charter breach provided an officer’s belief in 
the lawfulness of their conduct is both honestly and 
reasonably held. The trial judge’s finding that the 
officer’s belief in exigent circumstances was not 
reasonably held precluded a finding that he was 
acting in good faith. Justice Fitch, speaking for the 
unanimous Appeal Court, noted:
I can identify no evidence specific  to  this case 
c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g a n 
o b j e c t i v e l y  r e a s o n a b l e  b e l i e f t h a t 
exigent circumstances required the warrantless 
entry of the [accused’s] private dwelling-house. 
There was no  ev idence tha t anyone 
witnessed  the  arrests. There was no  evidence 
that the [accused] was being assisted by anyone 
else in running the drug  line. There was 
n o  e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e [ a c c u s e d ’ ] 
mother  or  brother were aware of his drug-
dealing  activities. There was no evidence that 
t h e [ a c c u s e d ] h a d t h e a b i l i t y t o 
contact any family member following his arrest. 
His  cellphone had been seized and the 
[accused] was, throughout the relevant 
period  of  time, in the custody  and  control of 
the police. The female  person suspected of 
purchasing  drugs from the [accused] in the 
bank  parking  lot was also in police custody. 
There was no  evidence of any movement 
within the [accused’s]  home after the  arrest. 
There was no evidence that anyone attempted 
to enter  the  [accused’s] residence after the 
[ a c c u s e d ’ s ]  a r r e s t . I n d e e d , t h e 
r e s i d e n c e  a p p e a r s t o h ave b e e n i n 
t o t a l  d a r k n e s s b e f o r e t h e 
warrantless entry occurred.
Th e o r e t i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g , t h e r e w i l l 
always  be  a  risk when the police make a 
public  arrest in a case of  this  kind that drugs 
being kept by the arrestee at a “stash house” 
may be moved  or  destroyed. There is nothing 
about this  case that raised this risk from the 
g e n e r a l t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r . I f 
exigent circumstances existed in this case, they 
would exist in every  case of this  kind and 
warrantless entries into private dwelling-houses 
to preserve the scene would become  the  rule, 
not the exception. [paras. 65-66]
Justice Fitch concluded that the officer “was not 
operating in unknown legal  territory”  and “the 
legal  principles governing the authority of the 
police  to enter a  residence without a warrant are 
‘well-established’,”  he said. “There is a 
l o n g  l i n e  o f  j u d g m e n t s f r o m t h e 
Supreme  Court  of  Canada considering the 
circumstances in which exigent circumstances may 
justify  the warrantless entry of a private dwelling-
house. To justify such  an  entry, the Crown 
must  show  some case-specific  urgency in the 
“Theoretically speaking, there will always be a risk when the police make a 
public arrest in a case of this kind that drugs being kept by the arrestee at a ‘stash 
house’ may be moved or destroyed. There is nothing about this case that raised 
this risk from the general to the particular. If exigent circumstances existed 
in this case, they would exist in every case of this kind and warrantless entries 
into private dwelling-houses to preserve the scene would become the rule, 
not the exception.”
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pursuit of an investigative imperative—in this case 
the preservation  of  evidence—and a serious  risk 
that waiting for  a  warrant would frustrate 
achievement of that imperative.” Here, the officer’s 
concern was general, speculative, and vague. There 
was nothing  specific to this investigation to 
objectively  support the officer’s  subjective  belief 
that delay would give rise to a serious risk evidence 
would be lost. “On the state of law that existed at 
the time of the warrantless entry, the police ought 
to  have  known they could  not rely on vague and 
speculative  concerns about the  preservation of 
evidence to  enter a  private  dwelling-house 
without a warrant,” said Justice Fitch. “They ought 
to  have  known that the investigative  information 
ava i l a b l e t o t h e m d i d  n o t  j u s t i f y t h e 
warrantless entry of residential premises.”
After conducting a new s. 24(2) analysis, the Court 
of Appeal concluded that the  admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. The very serious Charter breach and 
its serious impact on the accused’s Charter-
protected interests strongly favoured exclusion 
which was not outweighed by the reliability of the 
evidence or its importance to the Crown’s case:
I conclude that the admission of the evidence, 
rather than its  exclusion, would bring the 
administration  of  justice into disrepute. The 
violation reflects a serious  breach of 
established constitutional principles. It resulted 
in the unjustified  warrantless  entry of the 
[accused’s]  private dwelling-house and, 
as  a  result, undermined a privacy  interest that 
a t t r a c t s t h e h i g h e s t  d e g r e e o f 
Charter  protection. There is a concern, rooted 
in [the officer-in-charge’s] approach, that 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e u s e o f t h e 
exigent circumstances doctrine will give rise to 
unconstitutional privacy breaches in like cases 
in  the  future. To admit the evidence would, 
in  my  respectful  view, be using s.  24(2) to 
excuse  conduct which has in the past been 
found to be unlawful. In my view, this is a case 
where it is necessary for the Court to 
disassociate itself from the breach to  preserve 
the repute of the administration of justice 
in the long term. [references omitted, para. 99]
The  accused’s convictions were quashed and 
acquittals were entered on all charges.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[T]he legal principles governing the authority of the police to enter a residence 
without a warrant are ‘well-established.’ There is a long line of judgments from 
the Supreme Court of Canada considering the circumstances in which 
exigent circumstances may justify the warrantless entry of a private dwelling-
house. To justify such an entry, the Crown must show some case-specific urgency 
in the pursuit of an investigative imperative—in this case the 
preservation of evidence—and a serious risk that waiting for a warrant would 
frustrate achievement of that imperative.”
“On the state of law that existed at 
the time of the warrantless entry, 
the police ought to have known 
they could not rely on vague and
speculative concerns about the 
preservation of evidence to enter a 
private dwelling-house 
without a warrant. They ought 
to have known that the 
investigative information available 
to them did not justify the 
warrantless entry of 
residential premises.”
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CROWN MUST JUSTIFY 
CONTINUING WITH SEALING 
ORDER
R. v. Verrilli, 2020 NSCA 64
The applicant (Verrilli) was under 
investigation for allegedly possessing 
cocaine for the  purposes of trafficking 
but was never charged. The police 
had obtained three search warrants 
under s. 11(1) of the  Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act which they used to conduct 
searches of his home, business and motor vehicles. 
Various items, including cellular telephones and 
cash were seized during  the searches, but no 
cocaine was found. The ITOs in relation to all three 
search warrants were sealed under s. 487.3(1) of 
the Criminal Code by each issuing justice of the 
peace. The items that had been seized during the 
searches were returned to the applicant.
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The applicant, as an interested non-
accused party, applied under s. 487.3(4) 
of the Criminal Code to examine the 
sealed ITOs in order to determine why 
he had been the subject of the searches. He sought 
access to the ITOs to determine whether his rights 
under s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) or s. 9 
(arbitrary detention or imprisonment) of the Charter 
had been breached.The judge denied his 
application to access the sealed ITOs. In the  judge’s 
view, the applicant had not satisfied the burden in 
justifying access by showing more than a mere 
suspicion that the warrant was unlawfully 
authorized. 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The applicant sought judicial review of 
the decision refusing his access to the 
sealed ITOs, asking it be set aside. The 
Supreme Court judge found the 
Provincial Court judge incorrectly applied the test 
for accessing a sealed wiretap ITO, not a  search 
warrant ITO. The Supreme Court judge stated:
BY THE BOOK:
s. 487.3 Criminal Code 
Order denying access to information
s. 487.3 (1) On application made at the time 
an application is made for a warrant under 
this or any other Act of Parliament ... or at a 
later time, a justice, a judge of a superior 
court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge of the Court of 
Quebec may make an order prohibiting access to, and the 
disclosure of, any information relating to the warrant, order 
or authorization on the ground that
(a) the ends of justice would be subverted by the disclosure 
for one of the reasons referred to in subsection (2) or 
the information might be used for an improper purpose; 
and
(b) the reason referred to in paragraph (a) outweighs in 
importance the access to the information.
Reasons
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), an order may be 
made under subsection (1) on the ground that the ends of 
justice would be subverted by the disclosure
(a) if disclosure of the information would
(i) compromise the identity of a confidential 
informant,
(ii) compromise the nature and extent of an ongoing 
investigation,
(iii) endanger a person engaged in particular 
intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby 
prejudice future investigations in which similar 
techniques would be used, or
(iv) prejudice the interests of an innocent person; and
(b) for any other sufficient reason.
[...]
Application for variance of order
(4) An application to terminate the order or vary any of its 
terms and conditions may be made to the justice or judge 
who made the order or a judge of the court before which any 
proceedings arising out of the investigation in relation to 
which the warrant or production order was obtained may be 
held.
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This application relates to the right of a non-
accused target to access the ITOs that led to the 
issuance of three search warrants.  The 
legislative provisions governing search warrants 
are very different than those involving wiretaps.  
There is no legislative provision placing the 
onus on an applicant seeking to unseal an ITO 
similar to the statutory onus placed on an 
applicant seeking to unseal a wiretap.   ...  
Wiretaps are subject to very specific provisions 
in the Criminal Code   that limit access to the 
presumptively sealed packet of information. 
The Criminal Code search warrant provisions 
do not mirror the wiretap provisions.  However, 
a judicial officer may determine that an ITO 
should be sealed in accordance with s. 487.3 
of the Criminal Code.   I cannot conclude that 
Parliament intended these two regimes to be 
treated the same way.
Thus, the onus was not on the applicant seeking to 
unseal the search warrant ITOs to show evidence of 
an unlawful authorization. Rather the burden rested 
on the Crown to justify continuation of the sealing 
order. The matter was sent back to Provincial Court 
for a  further hearing with the appropriate burden of 
proof placed on the Crown in accordance with s. 
487.3(4) to determine whether the applicant should 
have access to a sealed ITOs.  
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The Crown then argued the 
Supreme Court judge erred in 
applying the wrong legal test for 
the applicant to access the sealed 
ITOs. 
Sealing Orders
Unlike a wiretap ITO, which is automatically 
confidential and placed under seal, a sealing order 
under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code is 
discretionary. Under s. 487.3, the party requesting 
a search warrant may also seek an order prohibiting 
access to the ITO. “Search warrants are important 
investigative tools for police,” said Chief Justice 
Wood. “Their effectiveness depends upon secrecy 
in the sense that the target should not be aware 
that a warrant has been issued. Once a warrant 
has been executed, the concerns over secrecy are 
diminished.”   After reviewing case law, the Court of 
Appeal stated:
[O]nce a warrant has been executed, there is a 
presumption that the ITO will become 
accessible to the public unless the party 
wishing to limit that access can justify the 
limitations being sought. This applies not just at 
the initial application for a search warrant 
where a sealing order may be requested, but 
also any subsequent application to vary or 
terminate that order under s. 487.3(4). [para. 
33] 
In this case,  the accused had learned that he had 
been the target of a criminal investigation and 
searches, which ultimately did not result in charges. 
He then applied under s. 487.3(4) to access the 
ITOs that had been used to obtain the search 
warrants. An application under s. 487.3(4) placed 
the burden on the Crown to justify the continuation 
of the sealing orders. 
Since the  Crown opposed the application for 
unsealing, it bore  the evidentiary burden of 
justifying the continuance of the sealing order. The 
applicant did not bear the  burden of providing 
evidence that the warrants were  unlawfully  granted 
before permitting access to the ITOs.
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the matter 
was remitted to Provincial Court for disposition.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Verrilli, 2019 NSSC 263
“[O]nce a warrant has been 
executed, there is a presumption 
that the ITO will become accessible 
to the public unless the party 
wishing to limit that access can 
justify the limitations being 
sought.”
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MORE ON SEALING ORDERS
The following excerpts were taken from the Public 
Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, 3.4 
Sealing Orders and Publication Bans:
2.1. Mandatory sealing of documents 
supporting a wiretap authorization
Section 187 of the Code mandates that all 
documents relating to an application under Part VI 
(which generally deals with wiretaps) must be 
sealed and kept by  the court in a place with no 
public access, subject only to further order of a 
court. A specific sealing  order is therefore not 
required.
However where  a wiretap authorization includes 
judicial authority for other investigative measures 
(for example a  general warrant or an assistance 
order) wiretap agents normally  should draft the 
proposed authorization to include a sealing order 
covering those aspects of the material.
[...]
2.2. Discretionary sealing in other cases of ex 
parte judicial authorization
Section 487.3 of the Code gives the issuing justice 
authority to order the sealing of material filed in 
support of an ex parte  application for a warrant 
under the Criminal Code or any other federal 
statute, a production order under ss. 487.012 or 
487.013 of the  Code, or a Feeney warrant under s. 
529 of the Code. Sealing is not automatic. The 
application for the sealing order will usually be 
made by the peace officer applying for the 
warrant or order, at the same time, and can be 
granted on the grounds set out in s. 487.3 of the 
Code.
The peace officer applying for the warrant or 
production order in question is therefore expected 
to provide affidavit material that details how and 
why one or more of the grounds mentioned in s. 
487.3(2) justifies a  sealing order. The most 
common grounds will be: to protect an ongoing 
police investigation; and to protect informer 
privilege.
Where the peace officer has neglected to obtain a 
needed sealing order at the time the  warrant was 
issued, or later decides that a sealing order should 
now be sought, s. 487.3 is still available as the 
section specifically says that the sealing order may 
be granted by the provincial court judge or justice 
““on application made at the time of issuing a 
warrant [or other order]…or at any time 
thereafter””. In such a case, Crown counsel may 
be consulted to assist in the application.
Different courts across Canada have different 
procedures in place to handle  sealing orders. In 
every case, however, the  sealing order should 
result in the material being kept in a secure 
location not subject to public access.
In some jurisdictions the issuing  justices grant 
sealing orders for a limited time, for example one 
year from the  date of issuance. This is to be 
discouraged, as if the grounds for sealing are to 
protect informer privilege, it may never be safe to 
unseal the original unvetted material. Crown 
counsel are encouraged to advise their 
enforcement agencies to seek sealing orders of 
unlimited duration.
SEALING ORDER FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO A
 Search Warrant  Telewarrant
 Production Order  Preservation Order
 Warrant or Authorization to Enter Dwelling-House
 Authorization to Omit Announcement Before Entry
Canada: Province of British Columbia
Pursuant to Section 487.3 of the Criminal Code
PCR 812a   03/2016
Upon the ex parte application made this day by 
a peace officer of  for an order to prohibit access to and the
disclosure of all records relating to a
  Search Warrant
  Production Order made pursuant to s.  Criminal Code
  Warrant to Enter Dwelling-House
  Authorization to Enter Dwelling-House
  Authorization to Omit Announcement Before Entry 
  Preservation Order
issued on (date) 
And upon reading the Affidavit of 
sworn/affirmed and filed in support of the application to prohibit access to and disclosure of those records;
IT IS ORDERED THAT all records in the custody or control of a Justice relating to the above-mentioned Warrant/
Production Order/Authorization(s)/preservation order not be accessed and disclosed to any interested party or member of 
the public until                                                                                                    .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all records relating to the above-mentioned Warrant/Production Order/Authorization(s)/
preservation order and the material filed in support of this application be placed in a sealed packet and kept in a secure place 
within the Court Registry
at  ,
British Columbia until  .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party may apply to the Justice or Judge who made the order or 
a Judge of the court to set aside or vary this order, on three (3) clear days notice being given to the 
Attorney General of British Columbia, Crown Counsel, or an agent for the Attorney General of Canada at 
,
British Columbia.
POLICE CASE / FILE NO.
Dated    date 
at    city 
British Columbia A Judge, Judicial Justice or Justice of the Peace in and for the Province of British Columbia
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PPSC RELEASES ANNUAL 
REPORT
The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) 
has released its 2019-2020 Annual Report. The 
report outlines a number of statistics related to the 
activities of the service, including the following.
PPSC Dispositions by Charge
Disposition 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
Acquittal After Trial 598 1,884 1,862 1,577 1,439
Conviction After Trial 1,151 3,185 2,557 1,947 1,673
Guilty Plea 17,876 27,330 25,332 23,208 17,833
Judicial Stay of Proceedings 21 201 305 109 118
Withdrawn/Crown Stay of Proceeding 10,835 48,182 48,033 43,571 35,519
Other (eg. discharge at preliminary hearing/mistrial) 357 625 137 108 137
PPSC Top 10 Federal Statutes
Statute # Charges Laid
CDSA 110,553
Criminal Code 109,383
Fisheries Act 5,713
Cannabis Act 4,628
Immigration & Refugee Protection Act 1,693
Employment Insurance Act 1,624
Income Tax Act 1,415
Customs Act 1,078
Excise Tax Act 959
Excise Act, 2001 601
CRIME DOWN DURING 
PANDEMIC BUT DOMESTIC 
DISTURBANCE CALLS UP
According to a recent Statistics Canada release, 
17 police services reported a 16% decrease in 
selected criminal incidents compared to same 
period in the previous year. However, the 
number of calls for wellness checks and 
domestic disturbances increased 4%.
Crime/Call for Service % change
Mar-Jun 2019 to 
Mar-Jun 2020
Assaults -11.5%
Sexual Assaults -19.0%
Uttering Threats -10.4%
Robbery -20.2%
Break & Enter -12.9%
Motor Vehicle Theft -15.2%
Shoplifting -46.0%
Domestic Disturbances/Disputes +11.6%
Mental Health Apprehensions +2.8%
Mental Health Other +10.6%
Child Welfare Check +18.8%
Suicide/Attempt Suicide -9.4%
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COURT SPLIT ON LEGALITY OF 
STRIP SEARCH
R. v. Ali, 2020 ABCA 344
 
Police received information from two 
confidential informers about two 
men trafficking crack cocaine from a 
van and an apartment complex. 
Police conducted surveillance  and 
corroborated the tips, making observations 
consistent with drug  trafficking. A search warrant 
was obtained for the apartment. When the search 
warrant was executed, police found three people, 
including the accused, inside the apartment. The 
accused did not immediately comply with the 
arresting officer’s commands. He was wearing 
baggy pants pulled partly down showing athletic 
shorts worn underneath, and he was seen reaching 
towards his nether region or back of his pants 
during the arrest. 
The arresting officer searched the accused. He 
found the accused in possession of a large amount 
of cash, a cell phone, and a small bag of 
marijuana. But no cocaine was located. A scale 
was also found in the apartment. When advised of 
his right to counsel, the accused said that he 
wanted to talk to a lawyer. The accused was 
transported to the police station. The arresting 
officer told the lead investigator about his 
observations. The lead investigator then phoned the 
Staff Sergeant at the jail , explained the 
circumstances of the arrest, and requested a  strip 
search of the accused. A strip search was 
conducted in a  private room and police found three 
white baggies containing cocaine in his “butt crack 
area”. After the strip search, the  accused was 
allowed to speak to counsel. He was subsequently 
charged with cocaine trafficking
Alberta Provincial Court
The lead investigator testified he had 
received information from the arresting 
officer about the accused making 
adjustments to the area near his 
buttocks. The lead investigator said  the accused 
had very little  time to hide anything when the 
police first entered the residence, but, based on his 
actions, it was believed he had concealed or was 
always concealing drugs on his person. “His clear 
adjustments kind of on his back end towards his -- 
his buttocks area lead me to believe that he may 
be concealing evidence in that area,” said the lead 
investigator. He was concerned with the accused’s 
safety, stating the cocaine could be  ingested anally 
through the body which could lead to an overdose 
or death. 
The judge recognized that the police must have 
both a subjective and an objective basis for a  strip 
search. He found there were both subjective and 
objective reasons for the police to believe that they 
could find evidence by way of a strip search given 
the totality of circumstances, including the facts 
outlined in the search warrant as well as the 
accused’s actions upon arrest. The accused was 
convicted of trafficking in cocaine. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused conceded there 
were reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest and search him, 
but there were insufficient 
reasonable and probable grounds to extend the 
search incidental to arrest to a strip search. In his 
view, the trial judge improperly used inadmissible 
hearsay in deciding whether the police objectively 
had reasonable grounds for the strip search and 
applied the wrong test in justifying it. In addition, 
he asserted the trial judge did not consider the 
higher threshold required to establish that the 
police had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that they would find evidence from a strip 
search.
The Crown suggested there were reasonable and 
probable grounds justifying the strip search. In the 
Crown’s view, the  following factors provided 
justification: the observation the  accused was 
adjusting his clothing around his buttocks; his non-
immediate  compliance with police requests; the 
information from the informers that the traffickers 
kept the drugs on their person; the cell phone, 
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scale, and cash found as well as the absence of 
cocaine found on the pat down and pocket search 
of the accused; and the extremely minimal time 
that the accused had to hide things when the police 
entered the premise.
Inadmissible “Hearsay”?
The accused submitted that there was insufficient 
admissible  evidence on the  voir dire  to justify the 
strip search. The lead investigator never actually 
saw the accused touch his buttocks. Rather, he was 
relying upon what the arresting officer told him. But 
the arresting officer did not testify about this 
observation. Therefore, the accused suggested this 
information was “hearsay” and could not be used 
to justify the strip search.  
The majority of the Court of Appeal noted that the 
information the lead investigator was providing was 
not actually  hearsay. “The essence of the hearsay 
rule is that an out-of-court statement is tendered 
as evidence to prove the truth of its contents,”  said 
the majority. It continued:
The out-of-court statement is not tendered 
through the party who made it, but some other 
party who heard it. Hearsay is inadmissible as 
evidence, subject to a number of exceptions. 
“Hearsay”, however, is a rule of evidence. It is 
only of significance to decision makers who are 
bound by the rules of evidence, generally 
speaking courts and tribunals that are required 
to make their decisions solely based on 
admissible evidence. Police officers conducting 
an arrest or search, or otherwise involved in an 
investigation, are not conducting a “hearing” or 
“trial”, and they are not bound by the “rules of 
evidence”. They are entitled to rely on any 
information they receive, so long as it is 
credible and reliable.
Police work is a team undertaking. In this case 
the execution of the search warrant, the 
resulting arrest, and the decision to conduct a 
strip search, were made as a result of 
information gathered by the team. This 
“information” was not necessarily all 
“admissible evidence”. As noted, [an officer] 
reported he observed the [accused] “reaching 
towards his nether region or the back of his 
pants” during the arrest. [The lead investigator] 
did not directly observe the [accused] 
“reaching towards his nether region”, but he 
received that information from [his fellow 
officer]. The decision to conduct the strip 
search was actually made by the Staff Sergeant 
on duty following a telephone conversation 
with [the lead investigator] The Staff Sergeant 
was not even on the scene of the arrest, but he 
was not conducting a hearing or a trial, and he 
was not bound by the rules of evidence. He 
was entitled to rely on information he thought 
was reliable and credible, and one police 
officer is entitled to rely on information 
provided by another. If, for example, [the lead 
investigator] had expressly told the Staff 
Sergeant: “I did not see it myself, but [my 
colleague] says he was reaching towards his 
nether region”, the Staff Sergeant would still 
have been entitled to rely on that information. 
The Staff Sergeant was not required to disregard 
that information on the basis that it was 
“hearsay”.
The issue on the voir dire was whether the 
police had reasonable and probable grounds 
justifying the strip search. This requires that the 
police officers subjectively believed that they 
had such grounds, and that there was an 
objective basis for that belief. The focus is on 
the information known to the police at the time 
the decision was made to conduct the search. 
Was that information sufficiently credible to 
justify reliance on it, and assuming it was 
reliable was it sufficient to objectively support 
the police’s conclusion that they had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the 
search? It is obviously prudent for the Crown to 
introduce as much evidence as is reasonable 
on the voir dire, but gaps in the admissible 
“Police work is a team undertaking. In this case the execution of the search 
warrant, the resulting arrest, and the decision to conduct a strip search, were made 
as a result of information gathered by the team.”
Volume 20 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2020
PAGE 23
evidence on the voir dire do not mean that 
there were gaps in the information available to 
the police when the decision was made to 
conduct the search. This appeal is a good 
example of that situation.
In this case, the trial judge was not required to 
find, as a matter of fact, that the [accused] 
“reached towards his nether region”. If such a 
finding had been necessary to sustain a 
conviction, it could only have been made 
based on admissible evidence. The trial judge, 
however, was only required to decide if, at the 
time the decision was made to conduct a strip 
search, the police team had “reasonable and 
probable grounds” to conduct that search. That 
depended on the information known to, 
believed, and reasonably relied on by the 
police team, specifically the Staff Sergeant. The 
fact that some of it may have been inadmissible 
as evidence at a trial was irrelevant. [reference 
omitted, paras. 11-15]
The information relied on by the police was 
properly introduced on the voir dire  and the trial 
judge was permitted to consider it when deciding 
whether there were reasonable  and probable 
grounds to conduct the strip search. 
Reasonable Grounds Justifying the 
Strip Search?
The accused again argued that he was unjustifiably 
subjected to a strip search. The Crown, on the other 
hand, asserted that there were reasonable and 
probable grounds for the strip search considering 
the entire context. At the time of his arrest, the 
accused’s pants were observed partly down and he 
was seen “reaching around his nether region, the 
back of his pants”. This, in the Crown’s view, 
supported a reasonable belief that the accused was 
concealing something in that location.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Golden, 
2001 SCC 83, determined that a strip search could 
be conducted incidental to a lawful arrest for the 
purpose of discovering weapons in the arrestee’s 
possession or evidence related to the reason for the 
arrest provided the police could establish 
reasonable and probable grounds justifying the 
strip search beyond the  reasonable and probable 
grounds justifying the arrest. 
In describing the test in Golden for reasonable and 
probable grounds justifying the strip search, the 
majority of the Court of Appeal stated:
[R]easonable and probable grounds justifying 
the arrest, or justifying an ordinary search 
incidental to that arrest, are not sufficient. The 
test of “reasonable and probable grounds” does 
not require proof on a balance of probabilities. 
Rather, that standard requires a factually based 
likelihood that there are grounds for the strip 
search, rising above mere suspicion, but not 
necessarily demonstrating grounds on a 
balance of probabilities. Reasonable and 
probable grounds exist where, for reasons 
above mere suspicion, it is not unlikely that 
evidence will be found during the search. 
[reference omitted, para. 19]
The trial judge’s decision that the police  had the 
necessary  reasonable and probable grounds to 
justify  the strip search was upheld. The overall 
context of the investigation, the execution of the 
search warrant and the observed movements of the 
accused justified it. The majority stated:
“[R]easonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest, or justifying an ordinary 
search incidental to that arrest, are not sufficient. The test of “reasonable and 
probable grounds” does not require proof on a balance of probabilities. Rather, that 
standard requires a factually based likelihood that there are grounds for the strip 
search, rising above mere suspicion, but not necessarily demonstrating grounds on 
a balance of probabilities. Reasonable and probable grounds exist where, for 
reasons above mere suspicion, it is not unlikely that evidence will be found during 
the search.” 
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The police team was entitled to conclude from 
the whole context that there were reasonable 
and probable grounds for a strip search. 
Surveillance and confidential informants had 
indicated there was drug trafficking from the 
building, and that someone fitting the 
description of the [accused] was involved. 
When the search warrant was executed, the 
[accused] was found on the premises. ...  
The [accused] was observed reaching towards 
his “nether region” and the back of his pants, 
which were below his waist. That certainly 
invited an inference that he was trying to hide 
something there. No specific evidence is 
needed that drug dealers sometimes conceal 
drugs in their body cavities; police experience 
is undoubtedly consistent with the hundreds of 
reported decisions recording such behaviour. 
The observed behavior was consistent with an 
inference that the drugs usually kept in his 
pocket were being relocated because of the 
police search. That may not have been the only 
available inference, but it was certainly an 
objectively reasonable inference that the police 
were entitled to rely on. The “reasonable and 
probable grounds” test does not require that the 
police eliminate all other reasonable 
inferences. ... That would come close to “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt”. Just because there 
might be an innocent explanation for observed 
behaviour does not preclude the police forming 
an objectively reasonable belief that a search 
will uncover drugs. 
The reasonable and probable grounds test in 
Golden also does not require, for example, that 
the police have direct information that the 
accused person has a history of hiding drugs on 
his person before a strip search is justified. ... 
Requiring such specific information would 
amount to a much higher standard than 
reasonable and probable grounds. Here the 
police had information that the [accused] 
would carry drugs in his pockets. The absence 
of any direct evidence of him concealing drugs 
in his person does not preclude the police 
reasonably inferring that, when confronted with 
the unexpected execution of a search warrant, 
the [accused] would hide his drugs anywhere 
he could. [paras. 20-22]
The strip search was lawful and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
A Second Opinion
Justice Veldhuis, in dissent, found the 
trial judge did not turn her mind to the 
proper test for a  strip search - whether 
the police had reasonable  and probable 
grounds for concluding that the strip search was 
necessary  in the particular circumstances of the 
arrest. “Charter-compliant reasonable and 
probable grounds have a subjective and an 
objective component,” said Justice Veldhuis. “The 
officer directing the strip search must subjectively 
have reasonable and probable grounds to conclude 
that the strip search is necessary in the 
circumstances; and ... the grounds must also be 
justifiable from an objective point of view such 
that a reasonable person placed in the position of 
the officer must be able to conclude that there 
were reasonable and probable grounds for the 
strip search.”
Justice Veldhuis agreed with the majority that “an 
officer can rely upon out-of-court statements and 
other information to formulate reasonable and 
probable grounds.” But she did not agree that the 
lead investigator’s evidence about the accused 
adjusting the clothing  around his buttocks was 
reliable. The arresting officer had the opportunity to 
testify about his observations but never said he saw 
the accused adjust his clothing by his buttocks, nor 
did he say he told the lead investigator such 
behaviour occurred.
Justice Veldhuis held the presence of the cell 
phone, scale, cash, marijuana and the lack of 
cocaine found on the accused after his pat down 
and pocket search; the information from the 
informers; and the short period of time between 
police entry and their observations, did not support 
reasonable and probable  grounds for a strip search. 
“There was no objective evidence to establish 
reasonable and probable grounds that drugs would 
be found there,” she said. “Given the  serious 
implications of strip searches on the personal 
freedom and dignity of individuals, a  better 
evidentiary foundation must be laid. In my view, 
there was no legal basis for carrying out the strip 
search, and therefore find that s. 8 of the Charter 
was breached.”
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Since the accused had already served his sentence, 
Justice Veldhuis found there was no need to 
determine whether the evidence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2) of the  Charter. She would 
have allowed the accused’s appeal and entered an 
acquittal. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
RCMP RELEASE FINAL REPORT 
ON STRIP SEARCHES
The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission 
for the RCMP released its “Review of the  RCMP’s 
Policies and Procedures Regarding Strip Searches” 
in October 2020. Things to note concerning the 
Commission’s review included the following:
• The RCMP’s national personal search policy 
(including cell block searches) was unclear and 
inadequate.
• Division policies pertaining to strip searches 
were either inadequate or inappropriate.
• Inadequate articulation and file  documentation 
of the grounds for a strip search.
• Inadequate t ra ining for members and 
supervisors.
• There was a  practice of routinely removing and/
or searching a prisoner’s undergarments, which 
was inconsistent with RCMP strip search 
policies and relevant jurisprudence. 
“During interviews with members 
and supervisors, the Commission 
also found that ongoing training in 
relation to strip searches was non-
existent.” [p. 19]
“Overall, the Commission found a 
dearth of adequate articulation, a 
lack of documented supervisory 
authorization of strip searches, 
and significant under-reporting of 
bra/undergarment removals as 
strip searches where removal of 
intimate clothing occurs as a 
matter of course. The extent of 
member non-compliance with 
RCMP strip search policies and 
relevant jurisprudence was 
significant.” [p. 28]
“Inadequate articulation and 
documentation pertaining to the 
member’s grounds for conducting 
a strip search, and the manner in 
which it was conducted, were 
recurring themes throughout the 
review. Lack of knowledge of what 
constitutes a strip search and 
inadequate supervision risk the 
violation of an individual’s 
Charter rights.” [p. 42]
“Members commented that they 
did not consider the act of 
stripping a prisoner of their 
clothing for safety or self-harm 
reasons as being a strip search, 
and consequently would not 
document the event.” [p. 30]
“[T]he Commission determined that 
RCMP divisions do not currently 
provide training with respect to strip 
search policy or require members to 
undergo such training.” [p. 20]
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s. 10(b) CHARTER BREACH BY 
NOT FOLLOWING-UP WITH 
DETAINEE WHEN LAWYER OF 
CHOICE NOT AVAILABLE
R. v. Moore, 2020 ONCA 662
The accused was arrested at 3:00 
p.m. for drug trafficking. He was 
given his right to counsel and 
cautioned. He never asked to speak 
to a lawyer at the scene of the  arrest 
and, after a lengthy delay, he was transported to the 
police station for processing. When he arrived at 
the police station, the accused declined a lawyer at 
6:48 p.m. Later, while  being served with some 
documents, the accused expressed a desire to call 
his lawyer. He provided a lawyer’s name and an 
officer called the lawyer. A message was left for the 
accused’s lawyer, but no call back was received. 
The officer never followed up with the accused by 
telling him he could speak with duty counsel if his 
own lawyer was not available. The accused was 
subsequently charged with trafficking fentanyl.
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge found the accused had been 
properly informed of his right to counsel 
at the  time of his arrest, but chose not to 
exercise that right until many hours later. 
When the accused finally decided to speak with a 
lawyer at 1:30 a.m., the police tried to call his 
lawyer of choice, but he could not be contacted. At 
this point, the police should have followed up with 
the accused to determine whether he wanted to 
speak to another lawyer. In failing to do so, the 
accused’s right to counsel was breached from 1:30 
a.m. onwards. The judge stated:
It is axiomatic that an arrestee is afforded rights 
to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. There 
is an informational component which 
mandatory upon each arrest.   This extends to 
being informed of the reasons for arrest under s. 
10(a). Implementation  of rights to counsel is 
only engaged once the arrestee makes such a 
request.   If the person doesn’t ask to speak to a 
lawyer after being advised of that right, the 
police have no further obligation to facilitate 
contact. I find that [the accused] was given his 
rights to counsel when he was arrested for 
trafficking at 3pm and then again when he was 
transported in custody later.   He was also given 
his rights to counsel again when he was 
booked into the police station at 6:48 pm.   At 
no time did he ever invoke his rights to 
counsel.   There is no s. 10(b) Charter breach in 
the facts up to that point.
[The accused] did ... ask for a lawyer at 1:30 
am on March 16, when he asked to be put in 
contact [his counsel of choice]. [The officer] 
left a message for [the lawyer]. When no call 
was returned to [the accused], there is no 
evidence that any follow up was done either 
with [the accused] or any other lawyer.   ...
The intermediate step, namely going back to 
the detainee and asking what further steps he or 
she would like to take was never done in this 
case.  I have no evidence that [the accused] 
ever spoke with a lawyer after 1:30am.   ... 
[references omitted, paras. 56-57, R. v. Moore, 
2017 ONCJ 496]
The judge, however, held this breach to be minor in 
nature and none of the evidence was excluded. The 
accused was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl and 
he was sentenced to six years imprisonment less 
time served in pre-trial custody.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
t h e t r i a l j u d g e e r r e d i n 
concluding that his s. 10(b) 
Charter rights were not breached 
shortly after his arrest. In the accused’s view, his 
right to counsel had been violated long before the 
police attempted to facilitate contact with his 
lawyer of choice. 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed:
There was ample evidence to have enabled the 
trial judge to conclude that the [accused] was 
informed immediately upon arrest and 
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repeatedly of his right to counsel and 
repeatedly waived that right until he requested 
to speak with his counsel around 1:30 a.m. In 
these circumstances, we do not accept the 
argument that his right to counsel was 
breached prior to the time when he requested 
to speak with counsel.
The s. 24(2) ruling is entitled to deference from 
this Court. There was a factual basis upon 
which the trial judge could conclude as he did, 
that the Charter breach at 1:30 a.m. was an 
isolated incident, and that the impact of the 
breach was minimal. [paras. 5-6]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Moore, 2017 ONCJ 496 and R. v. Moore, 2017 
ONCJ 801.
INFORMER INFORMATION: 
HOW COMPELLING, CREDIBLE 
& CORROBORATED IS IT?
R. v. Protz & Ford, 2020 SKCA 115
A police officer received information 
from three confidential informers 
(sources A, B and C) that the accused 
Protz was selling cocaine and the 
accused Ford was working with him. 
Police were also told Ford had sold her house and 
intended to use the money to buy a large amount 
of substance. The source information also revealed 
that Protz and Ford had left for the west coast to 
pick up “product”, had been involved in an 
accident, and were on their way back to Yorkton 
with it. Police were able to corroborate  some of the 
information provided. 
The lead investigator came to believe that Protz and 
Ford were now travelling back to Yorkton in a rental 
vehicle. She set up a team of officers to intercept 
the two suspects. When police located a rental van, 
they stopped it. They confirmed Protz (driver) and 
Ford (passenger) were its occupants and arrested 
them for possessing drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking. The vehicle  was searched and police 
found, among other things, bags containing 140 
g r a m s o f c o c a i n e a n d 1 9 8 g r a m s o f 
methamphetamine.   
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The lead investigator testified that she 
believed the information provided by all 
three  confidential sources was within 
their first-hand knowledge and was not 
rumour. She believed they  all were reliable and 
credible. Source  A had been a confidential 
informer for two years and information they had 
provided had led to three search warrants. Source A 
had received payment for information but was also 
motivated to assist in protecting  the community. 
Source  B had provided information for 18 months, 
had received payment for this information, and the 
information they provided had led to two search 
warrants. Source B’s information corroborated 
source A’s information. Source C had been an 
informer for seven months and had received 
payment for information they had previously 
provided. Source C had never been used in a 
search warrant application, but the information 
provided by source C was consistent with, and 
similar to, the information received from sources A 
and B. The lead investigator personally knew 
sources B and C, but source A was handled by a 
different officer who did not testify.
Both accused submitted that their arrests were 
unlawful because the police did not have the 
necessary  reasonable grounds. In their view, their 
rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been 
breached and the drug evidence ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2).  
The judge noted that s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code  authorizes a police officer to arrest a person 
without warrant who they believe, on reasonable 
grounds, to be committing, or is about to commit, 
an indictable  offence. Much of the information the 
lead officer had to support the grounds for the 
arrest came from the three informers. The judge 
found the arrest to be lawful. He was satisfied the 
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officer had a subjective belief that both accused 
had committed the offence of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and, considering all the 
circumstances cumulatively, her belief was 
reasonable. It clearly was more than a suspicion or 
a hunch. Much, although not all, of the informers’ 
information was corroborated, both between the 
informers and externally. Since there were no 
violations under the Charter, the application to 
exclude evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed. 
Both accused were convicted of possessing cocaine 
and methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking and were each sentenced to 40 months 
imprisonment concurrent for each offence less time 
spent on remand. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Both accused argued the trial 
judge erred in finding the police 
had reasonable grounds to arrest 
for possessing drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
Reasonable Grounds For Arrest
Justice Ottenbreit, authoring the unanimous Court 
of Appeal opinion, noted a police officer’s power of 
arrest is found in s. 495(1)(a) of the  Criminal Code: 
“A peace officer may arrest without warrant (a) a 
person who has committed an indictable offence 
or who, on reasonable  grounds, he believes has 
committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence.”  In addition, relying on prior case law, 
noted the following considerations:
• An arresting officer must subjectively hold 
reasonable  grounds to arrest and those grounds 
must be justifiable  from an objective point of 
view – in other words, a reasonable person 
placed in the  position of the arresting officer 
must be able  to conclude there were indeed 
reasonable grounds for the arrest.
• An arresting officer is not required to establish 
the commission of an indictable offence on a 
balance of probabilities or a prima facie case for 
conviction before making the arrest; but an 
arresting officer must act on something more 
than a “reasonable suspicion” or a hunch.
• An arrest ing off icer must consider al l 
incriminating and exonerating information which 
the circumstances reasonably permit, but may 
disregard information which the officer has 
reason to believe may be unreliable. 
• A reviewing court must view the evidence 
available to an arresting officer cumulatively, not 
in a piecemeal fashion.
Justice Ottenbreit also said:
To establish reasonable grounds, it is not 
necessary that the belief of the arresting officer 
was correct or that the inference drawn by the 
police officer from the available information be 
the only or most compelling inference. [para. 
39]
“Where officers are acting as a team, it is not 
necessary that the arresting officer personally 
know each and every fact necessary to establish 
reasonable grounds; the collective knowledge of 
the entire group is relevant,” Justice Ottenbreit 
added. “In assessing whether reasonable grounds 
existed, the trial judge must ask ‘whether the 
inference drawn by the arresting officer was a 
reasonable one to have made at the time of arrest 
based on the circumstances known to the officer at 
“Where officers are acting as a team, it is not necessary that the arresting officer 
personally know each and every fact necessary to establish reasonable grounds; 
the collective knowledge of the entire group is relevant.”
“To establish reasonable grounds, it is not necessary that the belief of the 
arresting officer was correct or that the inference drawn by the police officer from 
the available information be the only or most compelling inference.”  
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that time’. The trial judge must examine the 
‘indicators’ of criminal activity as a constellation, 
or cluster, leading or tending to a general 
conclusion. If the conclusion is objectively 
reasonable, the arrest will be lawful.”
The Three Cs
“Where a decision to arrest is based on 
information provided by confidential informants, 
courts must explore three lines of inquiry: the 
compelling nature of the information, the 
credibility of the informant, and the corroboration 
of the information provided,” said the Court of 
Appeal. These  three Cs are  also known as the 
Debot factors (R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 SCR 1140). 
Justice Ottenbreit explained the Debot factors as 
follows (references omitted):
• The Debot factors are not to be examined in 
isolation and the test is not to be applied 
formulaically 
• It is the totality of the circumstances that 
d e t e r m i n e s wh e t h e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
substantiates reasonable grounds for arrest: “it is 
not necessary that all three conditions of the 
Debot test be entirely satisfied, as a weakness in 
one component can be overborne by strengths 
in others” 
• The totality of the  circumstances provides the 
important contextual information as “what is 
suspicious in one context may tend to be neutral 
or exculpatory in a different setting”. [references 
omitted]
Compelling Nature of the Information
• The first Debot factor concerns the compelling 
nature  of the information. The court will look at 
the level of detail and precision of the tip: “the 
degree to which a confidential tip is compelling 
is a function of its detail”.
• The “more detail a tip includes the more 
compelling  it will be, and this is particularly so if 
the tip includes information not publicly 
known”. This factor also involves an examination 
of how the informant purports to have acquired 
the information; that is whether the information 
was obtained first-hand or through hearsay.
• The information cannot simply be in the form of 
“bald conclusory statements” and must be more 
than “mere rumour or gossip”. However, this 
does not mean that the Crown is “required to 
show that the detail  and precision of a tip 
‘excludes’ or ‘rules out’ the possibility of mere 
rumour or gossip or of coincidence”.
• Dated information is less compelling, as is more 
general information and information in the 
public domain.
• No individual piece of information may be 
compelling  but the  information looked at in 
totality may meet the “compelling” criterion.
• The compelling nature of information predicting 
the commission of an offence is a function of its 
content, detail and precision taken as a 
whole ... . The more detailed it is, the more 
compelling  it is. However, it may be expected 
that the detail from multiple sources will  not 
necessarily  be exact. If the  detail provided by 
two informants, although not exactly the same, 
is similar and consistent in crucial respects that 
bear on the question of “what, when, where, 
how and why” something is happening, the 
compelling  nature of the information is not 
necessarily  diminished. It is open to a court to 
infer the two versions of the information refer to 
the same event or provide information about the 
same action. 
“Where a decision to arrest is based on information provided by confidential 
informants, courts must explore three lines of inquiry: the compelling nature of 
the information, the credibility of the informant, and the corroboration of the 
information provided,”
“Dated information is less 
compelling, as is more general 
information and information in the 
public domain.”
Volume 20 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2020
PAGE 31
Credibility of the Informer
• The second Debot factor concerns credibility. 
An assessment of this factor involves scrutiny of 
the informant. The informant’s criminal record, 
particularly if this involves perjury or crimes of 
dishonesty, is a relevant consideration as is the 
e x i s t e n c e o f o u t s t a n d i n g ch a r g e s o r 
investigations pending against the informant.
• The history of the informant’s tips is also relevant 
in assessing credibility, such as whether these 
previous tips had contained reliable  information. 
The length of the  relationship between the 
informant and the police  officer involved can 
enhance credibility as can the volume of tips 
provided during the relevant period. Further, a 
tipster’s credibility  is increased if the  previous 
tips related to the same type of offence as the 
current information.
• The informant’s reason or motivation for offering 
the tip is also relevant.
• Credibility must be established either on the 
testimony of the officer dealing  with the 
informant or some other evidence.
• The lack of evidence about an untried informant 
can be overcome on the balance of the Debot 
test if the information provided in the tip is 
sufficiently precise and corroborated. 
Corroboration of the Information
• The third Debot factor concerns corroboration. 
This factor does not require the police to 
substantiate each aspect of the tip in their 
subsequent investigation and surveillance “so 
long as the sequence of events actually  observed 
conforms sufficiently to the anticipated pattern 
to remove the possibi l i ty  of innocent 
coincidence”.
• Corroboration evidence need not confirm illegal 
activities. However, while there is no general 
requirement “to corroborate any criminal 
activity, or any activity that, although not illegal, 
could be  viewed as reasonably anticipatory to 
illegal activity”, a lack of this evidence can, 
depending on the totality of the  circumstances, 
undermine the case for an objectively 
reasonable grounds for arrest.
• The criminal record of a suspect can often 
provide corroboration although “the cogency of 
the criminal record depends on its similarity to 
the criminal activity alleged by the tipster and 
the age of the record”.
• Corroborat ion may, depending on the 
circumstances, be provided from “confirmation 
of neutral data”.
• Information from multiple  informants can be 
corroborative inter se. 
Were There Reasonable Grounds?
In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
police had the necessary grounds to make the 
arrest. The information as a whole was compelling. 
“I am satisfied that each informant referred to the 
same trip, the same people and the same 
impending return, as well as their possession of 
drugs,”  said Justice Ottenbreit. “The information of 
“The history of the informant’s tips is also relevant in assessing credibility, such 
as whether these previous tips had contained reliable information. The length of 
the relationship between the informant and the police officer involved can 
enhance credibility as can the volume of tips provided during the relevant period. 
Further, a tipster’s credibility is increased if the previous tips related to the same 
type of offence as the current information.”
“The criminal record of a suspect 
can often provide corroboration 
although ‘the cogency of the 
criminal record depends on its 
similarity to the criminal activity 
alleged by the tipster and the age of 
the record’.”
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all three informants, while  not exact and while 
differing in detail, is consistent.” While some of 
the information provided was capable of being 
known from public sources, some of it was not 
common knowledge or widely known, making it 
more compelling. As was the information speaking 
to the imminent actions of the accused. These were 
not bald assertions. This information was detailed 
enough to allow for a conclusion that the 
information was more than gossip. And further, the 
informers acquired the  information first-hand. It 
was not rumour. “Taken as a  whole, the content of 
the information and detail provided by the 
informants was compelling,” said the  Court of 
Appeal. “It spoke of a past trafficking of a 
controlled substance by [both accused]. It 
predicted an ongoing trafficking of a controlled 
substance and an imminent arrival of that 
substance in Yorkton. It predicted that Mr. Protz 
would be driving a rental vehicle on the way back 
to Yorkton. Most, if not all of it, was confirmed 
directly or indirectly. There was sufficient 
assurance that the information was reliable and 
was first-hand.”
The information was also credible. There was more 
than a bald statement that the sources were 
credible. There was evidence about the sources 
involvement with the police which provided an 
evidentiary basis for the court to assess their 
credibility and reliability. ”Evidence that a source 
previously provided accurate information about 
criminal conduct demonstrates the reliability and 
credibility of the source,”  said Justice Ottenbreit. 
“The sources in this case were not anonymous 
tipsters. Each had a ‘track record’ with the police 
in providing information about criminal conduct. 
At least two of them had a financial motivation to 
provide accurate and therefore rel iable 
information because the amount they were paid 
depended on how helpful the information was.” 
Moreover, other informers or investigative avenues 
can confirm part, or all, of the information 
provided. Two of the informers had knowledge of 
information that was not widely known and 
supported the view that they were both closely 
acquainted with both accused and were thus more 
likely to be privy to the criminal activity  they 
reported. Their information would be seen to be 
reliable  and credible  as a result. Further, their 
information was confirmed by police investigation 
further enhancing their accuracy as informers.
Finally, the information was corroborated. “A 
substantial portion of the information provided by 
the informants overlapped and therefore 
corroborated each other,”  said the Court of Appeal. 
“Some of the  source information was confirmed 
by the police. ... There was, as a whole, sufficient 
corroboration of the information of A, B and C by 
each other and by way of other investigative 
evidence.”
The trial judge did not err in concluding there were 
reasonable grounds for arrest and in finding no ss. 
8 or 9 Charter violations. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: The actual case contains many 
details provided by the sources and the  efforts 
made by police to corroborate those details.
NO STANDING TO ARGUE s. 8 
CHARTER BREACH IN 
ABANDONED MACHINE SHOP
R. v. Herntier, 2020 MBCA 95                 
A transgender sex-trade worker was 
reported missing by her sister on 
October 18, 2004. On November 3, 
2 0 0 4 , h e r n a k e d b o dy w a s 
discovered wrapped in plastic shrink 
wrap and plastic garbage bags, held together with 
tape, laying in the bushes at a  rest stop. A friend 
and co-worker of the deceased told police about a 
man the deceased had been with six times, 
provided a description of the man and his truck, 
including its licence plate number. An address of 
the man’s shop was also provided. The police 
began an investigation of the  accused as a  suspect 
in the murder. 
The police obtained a general warrant to search the 
machine shop at 755 Walsh Street the accused had 
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leased and conducted a search of it on February 17, 
2005. They were looking for the location where the 
deceased had been killed. They found what they 
believed to be drops of blood projected on a wall. 
Based on these observations, police  obtained a 
second warrant to conduct a further search the next 
day. They seized evidence, which turned out to be 
the deceased’s blood. This, along with other 
evidence, resulted in a charge of second degree 
murder.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused testified he did not know 
the deceased and denied that he had 
killed her. He said he ran a machine 
shop but that he moved out on October 
15, 2004, because his business was not doing 
well. The accused postulated that, if the deceased 
was killed at his former machine shop, it was after 
he vacated the premises on October 15, 2004.  
Among other challenges to the evidence, the 
accused applied under s. 8 of the Charter to 
exclude the evidence  seized pursuant to the 
general warrant and the search warrant executed at 
the machine shop. He suggested, in part, that the 
warrant did not contain the required reasonable 
grounds to justify its issuance. The Crown asserted 
that the accused lacked standing to bring the 
motion for exclusion.
The accused’s motion was dismissed and the 
evidence was admitted. The judge found that the 
accused lacked standing to challenge the 
admissibility of the evidence seized from the 
machine shop because he had abandoned the 
premises and, therefore, had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it. The judge stated:
Based on the totality of the evidence 
before the court it is clear to me that the 
accused had closed his West End 
Machine shop business at 755 Wall 
Street. He had not communicated with 
the building owner since November 
2004 and was behind on his rent 
payments prior to the execution of the 
General Warrant. All available evidence 
shows he was working in Alberta. His 
brother Sterling who was running a 
vacuum shop in the front of the premises 
confirmed to the building owner that the 
accused was gone and he himself had also 
moved out and returned the key to 755 Wall to 
the owner. In fact, the space was being 
advertised for rent to the public as early as 
February 18, 2005. By his actions the accused 
had abandoned the space that is the area 
containing the four walls of 755 Wall that were 
searched, thereby relinquishing any privacy 
interests he had.  I must add that, although an 
applicant is not required to testify in order to 
establish an expectation of privacy, the fact 
remains that the accused in this case did not do 
so.  I am therefore left with no evidence of the 
accused’s subjective expectation of privacy. As 
a result, for all these reasons, I find that the 
accused has no standing to challenge the 
search warrant for 755 Wall Street of February 
17, 2005.
The accused was convicted by a  jury of second 
degree murder.  
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting  evidence 
obta ined pursuant to the 
warrants related to the machine shop. He asserted 
that he had standing to challenge the warrant 
because  he had the legal status as a tenant of the 
premises with a valid lease  that did not expire until 
March 31, 2005. He said that it had not been 
terminated by the landlord and, since it had not 
been terminated, he had an automatic one-year 
renewal provision. He suggested that, as a tenant, 
his lawful right to possession was still in effect and 
he continued to have a reasonable expectation of 
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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privacy that was sufficient to give him to standing to 
challenge the search.
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
trial judge did not err in finding that the accused 
had abandoned the premises prior to the search 
and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the 
search.
Standing
Before a person can argue they were subjected to 
an unreasonable search or seizure they must first 
establish standing. If an accused can establish 
personal exposure to the consequences of an 
unreasonable search or seizure, they will be given 
the right to challenge the admission of the evidence 
obtained therefrom. “Section 8 is available to 
confer standing on an accused who had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises 
where the seizure  took place, and the burden of 
proving an evidentiary basis for any violation rests 
on the accused,” said Justice Beard. “Whether the 
accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
to be determined on the basis of the  totality of the 
circumstances.”
While one could quibble over whether it was 
technically correct to say that the accused was 
“formerly renting” the space ... , given that the 
lease had not expired, it is difficult to see how 
he could claim to be still renting the property 
when he had moved out, had not paid rent for 
two months and had returned the key to the 
landlord.
In my view, any right that the accused may 
have had in the premises arising out of the 
unexpired portion of the lease (if, in fact, he 
had any rights) is no different from the right of 
the accused in [R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17] to 
retrieve items from his garbage before it was 
picked up. That does not change the fact that, 
at the time the police seized the garbage in 
Patrick, and the time that the police obtained 
the general warrant in this case, the accused’s 
interest and, therefore, his reasonable 
expectation of privacy, had been abandoned.
[...] 
...   The accused had done all that he could to 
abandon the lease.   While he could have given 
notice to terminate the lease, that was not 
going to happen because he was skipping out 
on two months of rent.   In my view, he was 
clearly acting in a manner inconsistent with the 
reasonable assertion of either a tenancy interest 
in the property or a continuing privacy interest.  
[paras. 204-207]
The Court of Appeal concluded the  trial judge was 
correct in finding the accused had abandoned the 
premises and, therefore, had no standing  to 
challenge the search warrant.  The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POLICE LAWFULLY IN 
RESIDENCE: NO FEENEY 
WARRANT REQUIRED FOR 
ARREST
R. v. Stairs, 2020 ONCA 678
A citizen called 9-1-1 about 15 
minutes after he claimed he saw the 
male  driver of another vehicle 
striking a female  passenger. The 
caller described the make, model 
and colour of the car, and provided a licence plate 
number of either “BEWN 480” or “BEWN 483”. He 
also described the driver as a white male, between 
the ages of 25 to 35, with a buzz cut or shaved 
head. Police located a suspect vehicle parked in 
the driveway of a residential address, close to 
where  the 9-1-1 caller had made his observations. 
The vehicle provided matched the make and model 
but bore licence plate “BEWN 840”.  The attending 
“Section 8 is available to confer standing on an accused who had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the premises where the seizure took place, and the 
burden of proving an evidentiary basis for any violation rests on the accused.”
Volume 20 Issue 5 ~ September/October 2020
PAGE 35
officers believed this was the correct vehicle. A 
person listed as a driver of the vehicle showed 
cautions for violence, family  violence and being a 
flight risk. 
An officer at the location of the vehicle contacted 
the 9-1-1 caller and confirmed the information 
provided to the police. The caller also explained 
that the female had been struck multiple times – in 
a “flurry of strikes” – and had been placed in a 
headlock and was “turtling” from the strikes. The 
police repeatedly knocked at the front door of the 
residence and announced their presence, but no 
one came to the door. Concerned for the safety of 
the female passenger, the police entered the home 
without a warrant through a side door they found 
unlocked and loudly announcing “police”. 
One of the officers looked down the basement 
steps and saw a man run by, from the right to the 
left side of the basement. The officer instructed all 
those present in the basement to come upstairs. 
Eventually, a woman came up the steps. She had 
fresh injuries to her face. Two officers then 
descended into the basement. At the bottom of the 
stairs a living room was to the right and a laundry 
room was to the left. The accused was found in the 
laundry room and arrested. One of the officers 
then conducted a “sweep” search of the living 
room area. He was not looking for evidence, but 
rather was clearing it for safety  reasons. During his 
visual sweep of the living room, the officer saw a 
plastic container behind a sofa. The container was 
coloured, but transparent, and it was sitting out in 
the open on the floor. He saw what looked like 
glass shards inside the container, believed to be 
methamphetamine. And, as he was finishing his 
sweep of the room, the officer also saw a plastic 
Ziplock bag lying near a  pizza box, also containing 
what he believed was methamphetamine. The 
a c c u s e d wa s ch a r g e d w i t h p o s s e s s i n g 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, 
assault and failing  to comply with a probation 
order.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the police 
entered the home because they were 
legitimately concerned with the  safety of 
the female and police entry was justified 
under the common law ancillary powers doctrine. 
The accused’s arrest in the home was lawful. The 
safety sweep was also lawful as a search incident to 
arrest. The police entered the living room after the 
arrest to ensure that there were no safety  hazards. 
This  was a “valid objective,” to make sure that “no 
one else was there and that there were  no other 
hazards.” The drugs were located in plain view and 
could be seized. The methamphetamine was sitting 
out in the open when the officer did a brief sweep 
of the room for safety  purposes. The accused was 
convicted of assault, breach of probation, and 
possessing methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convic t ion for possess ing 
methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking. Although 
he accepted the  lawfulness of police entry, he 
suggested the police had insufficient grounds to 
arrest him and needed a Feeney warrant to make 
the arrest inside the home. Further, the accused 
argued that, after he was arrested, the police 
conducted an unlawful search of a  basement living 
room. Thus, the drugs ought to have been excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
“[T]here is both a subjective and objective component to the test for a warrantless 
arrest on an indictable offence. The subjective component requires that the police 
hold an honest belief that the person committed the offence. ... The objective 
component requires that the officer’s belief be objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.”
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The Arrest
Justice Fairburn, writing the decision for a two 
member majority, agreed with the trial judge that 
the police entry was authorized under the common 
law ancillary powers doctrine. She stated:
The officers on scene, whose evidence the trial 
judge accepted as credible and reliable, 
repeatedly knocked at the front door to the 
residence, yet were met with silence. That 
silence was concerning. At the time, all the 
police knew was that a female had been 
seriously assaulted in a motor vehicle that was 
now sitting in the driveway of the home. With 
the car present, it was reasonable to expect that 
the car occupants were in the home and to fear 
that the door was not being answered because 
the victim was suffering further violence.
It is against that backdrop that the police had to 
make a decision. The consequences of not 
responding quickly and decisively could have 
been grave. While the female in this case 
eventually walked out of the basement, in 
another case, she might not have. The luxury of 
time was not on offer. The police had a duty to 
ensure safety and their exercise of powers – 
entering the home without a warrant in order to 
locate the female occupant that had been seen 
by the 9-1-1 caller – was a justifiable exercise 
of power associated with that duty. [paras. 
18-19]
As for the arrest, the police had valid grounds to 
make it:
[T]here is both a subjective and objective 
component to the test for a warrantless arrest 
on an indictable offence. The subjective 
component requires that the police hold an 
honest belief that the person committed the 
offence. The trial judge accepted that the 
officers in this case subjectively believed that 
they had reasonable grounds to arrest. The 
objective component requires that the officer’s 
belief be objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time 
of the arrest.
In my view, the circumstances of this case 
amply justified the arrest from both a subjective 
and objective perspective. I would not give 
effect to the [accused’s] suggestion that the 
objective grounds were weakened by the fact 
that there was no direct evidence that the 
woman and man in the residence were the 
people from the car. The fact is that there is no 
requirement that an arrest rely upon direct, as 
opposed to circumstantial, evidence. In this 
case, there was very strong circumstantial 
evidence that the people located in the home 
were the ones seen by the 9-1-1 caller.
From the first floor, one of the officers saw a 
man matching the description given by the 
9-1-1 caller (white, 25-35 and shaved head). 
The female had visible injuries to her face, 
described as cuts, scratches, bruising, markings 
and swelling, all consistent with the assault that 
the 9-1-1 caller had described. With a minor 
variation to the licence plate number, the car in 
the driveway matched the description given by 
the 9-1-1 caller. The [accused] was also 
associated to that vehicle through a police 
record check. [references omitted, paras. 
24-26]
The trial judge did not err in holding that a 
reasonable person in the position of the arresting 
officers would be able to conclude that there were 
objectively reasonable grounds to arrest.
Feeney Warrant? 
The majority also rejected the accused’s contention 
that, even if the police had sufficient grounds to 
arrest him, they were required to obtain a Feeney 
warrant before doing  so. He had argued that, once 
the female had been isolated from the accused, she 
was safe and the police  were  required to leave the 
residence to obtain the Feeney  warrant to effect his 
arrest. Moreover, he opined that if the female  did 
not wish to go with police  when they left to get the 
Feeney warrant, an officer could have stayed with 
her in the kitchen and left the  accused in the 
basement until the Feeney warrant arrived.
Although it was decided in R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 
S.C.R. 13 that a warrant is generally necessary to 
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effect an arrest inside a residence, a Feeney  warrant 
was not necessary  in this case. “Although the 
police  originally entered the home over safety 
concerns, once they found a female inside of the 
residence and concluded that she was the victim of 
the assault witnessed by the 9-1-1 caller, it was 
open to them to go into the basement to effect the 
arrest,” said Justice Fairburn. She continued:
The officers were understandably concerned 
about what the [accused] was doing in the 
basement when he refused to come upstairs in 
response to the police commands. As one of 
the officers explained, in evidence accepted by 
the trial judge: “I don’t know what he’s doing, if 
he’s grabbing a weapon in that room, so no, … 
she’s not a hundred per cent safe at that point, 
… I don’t know what he’s doing in that room so 
she’s, in my mind she’s, she’s not a hundred per 
cent safe.” In that officer’s view, the best way to 
ensure the woman’s safety, and officer safety, 
was to effect the arrest: “I didn’t spend too 
much time talking to her. I didn’t know what he 
was doing so my main focus was on him. If I 
stopped to talk to her and he came out with a 
weapon, I’d be at a disadvantage.” 
In any event, as important as a Feeney warrant 
is for protecting the privacy of those inside of 
private dwellings when the police come to 
effect arrests, they authorize the police to 
“enter a dwelling-house described in the 
warrant for the purpose of arresting or 
apprehending” a person: Criminal Code, ss. 
529(1), 529.1. The whole purpose of the Feeney 
warrant is to protect the elevated privacy 
interests in a home, requiring certain grounds 
to be met before entry can be made to effect an 
arrest. Yet, in this case, the police had already 
legitimately entered a dwelling-place under the 
ancillary powers doctrine. They were lawfully 
inside of the residence and it would make no 
sense to require them to leave to obtain an 
authorization to enter again, only to effect an 
arrest that they could clearly make without 
warrant if it was anywhere other than a private 
dwelling.
Moreover, it would be impractical in 
circumstances like this case to require the 
police to leave and obtain a home entry 
warrant to make an arrest in a home that they 
were already lawfully in. This is particularly 
true in this case, where the [accused] 
acknowledges that, if the complainant had 
been unprepared to leave, an officer would 
have had to wait inside of the residence with 
her while other officers did the work to obtain a 
Feeney entry warrant. Any such approach 
would have the effect of potentially aggravating 
– not assuaging – privacy concerns. [paras. 
31-33]
Nor did the police need to limit their activity in the 
home to providing assistance to any possible 
victim. The  police had entered in exigent 
circumstances, concerned for the safety  of a person 
possibly  in need of assistance, and were permitted 
to effect the arrest once those grounds for arrest 
crystalized. 
“Although the police originally entered the home over safety concerns, once they 
found a female inside of the residence and concluded that she was the victim of 
the assault witnessed by the 9-1-1 caller, it was open to them to go into the 
basement to effect the arrest.”
“The whole purpose of the Feeney warrant is to protect the elevated privacy 
interests in a home, requiring certain grounds to be met before entry can be made 
to effect an arrest. Yet, in this case, the police had already legitimately entered a 
dwelling-place under the ancillary powers doctrine. They were lawfully inside of 
the residence and it would make no sense to require them to leave to obtain an 
authorization to enter again, only to effect an arrest that they could clearly make 
without warrant if it was anywhere other than a private dwelling.”
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Incidental Search
The majority also rejected the accused’s suggestion 
that the police needed reasonable grounds to 
believe that officer safety was at stake and that a 
search was necessary to address their specific 
concern before searching the basement living area:
Had the [accused] been arrested outside of his 
home, there is no question that the well-known 
and often applied search incident to arrest 
doctrine would have been available to conduct 
a search. A search incident to arrest must be 
“truly incidental to the arrest,” meaning that the 
police must have a “reason related to the arrest 
for conducting the search” at the time that it is 
carried out. The search must also be objectively 
reasonable in nature.
The purposes for a search incident to arrest 
include that the police are searching the 
immediate surroundings to the arrest to: (a) 
ensure the safety of the police, the public and 
the accused; (b) preserve evidence; and (c) 
discover evidence that may be used at trial. 
Therefore, when considering whether a search 
is lawful incident to arrest, the court must 
consider: (a) the purpose of the search; (b) 
whether that purpose was a valid law 
enforcement purpose that was connected to the 
arrest; and (c) whether the purpose identified 
for the search was objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances.
I do not accept the [accused’s] core proposition 
that the only way that the police could enter 
the basement living room, and look behind the 
sofa located closer to the centre of the room, 
was if they had reasonable grounds to believe 
that their safety was at risk. If that were the test 
to be applied in circumstances such as these, 
the police would often be at grave risk. 
[references omitted, paras. 50-52]
And further:
[A] person who is under lawful arrest has a 
lower reasonable expectation of privacy. In the 
context of an arrest, the key consideration is 
not whether there exist reasonable grounds to 
believe, but whether the objective of the search 
is connected to the arrest and whether it is 
reasonable in the circumstances. ...
Searching for safety at the scene of an arrest has 
long been understood to be of critical 
importance. The ability of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine to permit the police to respond 
to the dynamic and often dangerous nature of 
arrest scenes has remained a staple in s. 8 
jurisprudence. ...
I accept the [accused’s] suggestion that when 
the police enter a residential address in 
circumstances such as this, in fulfillment of 
their obligation to protect life, they are highly 
constrained in what they can do. The law must 
not develop in a way that allows the police to 
use a home entry in urgent circumstances to 
create the opportunity for a windfall search.
At the same time, the law must be practical. 
The police can be placed at serious risk when 
“[W]hen considering whether a search is lawful incident to arrest, the court must 
consider: (a) the purpose of the search; (b) whether that purpose was a valid law 
enforcement purpose that was connected to the arrest; and (c) whether the 
purpose identified for the search was objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances.”
Searching for safety at the scene of an arrest has long been understood to be of 
critical importance. The ability of the search incident to arrest doctrine to permit 
the police to respond to the dynamic and often dangerous nature of arrest scenes 
has remained a staple in s. 8 jurisprudence.”
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they enter a private residence. So too may 
civilians be placed at serious risk. In this case, 
the police were essentially in the basement of a 
home, with a man in handcuffs, and no way of 
knowing whether someone with access to a 
weapon was hiding behind the sofa in the room 
that they would have to pass in order to ascend 
the stairs with the handcuffed man and to exit 
the residence. This was a potentially dangerous 
situation.
In my view, when the police are present in a 
residence without judicial authorization, it may 
well be that the full panoply of police powers 
that are typically available under the search 
incident to arrest doctrine are not available 
with the same force as they would otherwise 
be. In particular, it may be that a search for 
evidence that may be permitted outside of the 
residence, would not be permitted in this 
situation.
That is not this case, though. Here, the trial 
judge accepted as a fact – a fact to which we 
must show deference on appeal – that the 
police only swept the room looking for safety 
hazards. It is in the context of that sweep that 
she accepted that the officers found the 
methamphetamine in plain view.
Of course, the plain view doctrine is a seizure 
doctrine, not a search doctrine. ... [T]here are 
four criteria to be applied in determining 
whether the doctrine is operative: (a) whether 
the police were lawfully positioned relative to 
where the item(s) were found; (b) whether the 
nature of the evidence was immediately 
apparent as constituting an offence; (c) whether 
it was discovered inadvertently; and (d) 
whether the item(s) were visible without any 
exploratory search. [references omitted, paras. 
56-62]
In upholding the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
police actions were supported by the search 
incident to arrest and plain view doctrines, Justice 
Fairburn summarized as follows:
In the end, the police were able to articulate 
why they had safety concerns. That articulation 
made sense. They had descended into a 
basement where they had never been before, in 
a house they had never been in before. While 
the 9-1-1 caller said that there were two people 
in the car that he observed, that did not mean 
there were only two people in the home. Nor 
did it mean that there were no other safety 
concerns hiding around corners.
In particular, the police could not see behind 
the sofa from the doorway to the living room. It 
was not unreasonable to take a quick visual 
scan of the room in the circumstances. They 
had a person in handcuffs and needed to 
ascend the stairs, which were located right 
beside the living room, to safely get him out of 
the residence, all while the female remained on 
t h e f i r s t f l o o r . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e 
methamphetamine was sitting out in plain view 
meant that it could be seized. [paras. 67-68]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Another View
Jus t ice Nordheimer agreed wi th 
majority’s  opinion about the legality of 
the police entry  into the residence,  that 
valid grounds to arrest existed, and that 
police did not require a Feeney  warrant. However, 
he did not agree that the warrantless “safety 
search”  of the basement living area was reasonable. 
He was unconvinced the police demonstrated 
“objectively verifiable necessity”  to conduct the 
search. In his view, the officers did not have 
sufficient objectively reasonable grounds to 
conduct a safety  search of the basement living  area. 
Thus, the search breached s. 8 of the Charter and 
Justice  Nordheimer would have excluded the 
evidence under s. 24(2). He would have allowed 
the appeal, set aside the accused’s drug conviction 
and entered an acquittal.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[T]he plain view doctrine is a seizure doctrine, not a search doctrine.”
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2020 BC ILLICT DRUG TOXICITY 
DEATHS ALREADY OUTPACE 
PREVIOUS YEAR
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January 1, 2010 to September 
30, 2020. In September 2020 there were  127 
suspected drug toxicity deaths. This represents a 
+112% increase over the number of deaths 
occurring in September 2019 (60).
In 2020, there have been a total of 1,202 suspected 
drug overdose deaths from January to September. 
This is more that all of 2019‘s total and represents 
an increase of 441 deaths over the 2019 numbers 
for the same time period (761). 
People aged 40-49 have been the hardest hit in 
2020 with 288 illicit drug toxicity deaths followed 
by 30-39 year-olds (286) and 50-59 years-old 
(267).  People aged 19-29 had 224  deaths while 
60-69 year olds had 113  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 291  followed by Surrey (142), 
Victoria (102), Kamloops (43), Abbotsford (39), and 
Kelowna and Prince George each with 88.   
Overall, the 2020 statistics amount to about four (4) 
people dying every day of the year.
Males continue to die at a 4:1  ratio compared to 
females. From January  to September 2020, 967 
males had died while there were 235 female 
deaths.
The January to September 
2020 data indicated that 
most illicit drug toxicity 
deaths (84%) occurred 
ins ide whi le  14.5% 
occurred outside. For 21 
deaths, the location was 
unknown. 
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“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 52 months preceding the 
declaration (Oct 2011-Mar 2016) totaled 1,795. 
The number of deaths in the 54 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Sep 2020) totaled 
5,996. This is an increase of more than 234%.
21174
27
306
674
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Sep 2020
Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2010 to 
September 30, 2020.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General, Coroners Service. October 20, 2020.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2019 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 82.9%  of deaths, cocaine (49.8%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(34.2%), ethyl alcohol (27.9%), heroin (14.6%) and methadone (6.7%). Other opioids (17.3%) and other 
drugs (16.5%) were also detected. 
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Age of victim
Gender of victim
Gender of 
accused person
92% of human trafficking 
victims knew their trafficker
19%
women
45%
18 to 24
28%
under 18
97%
women
81%
men
3%
men
26%
25 and older
Human trafficking involves 
recruiting, transporting, 
transferring, holding, 
concealing or exercising 
control over a person, for 
the purposes of 
exploitation.
1,708
32%
90%
Since 2009:
44% of human trafficking incidents involved other offences
 
21%39%63%
involved 
offences 
related
to the sex 
trade
involved sexual 
assault or 
other sexual 
offences
involved 
physical 
assault 
Of these:
Spouse, boyfriend, 
girlfriend or intimate 
partner
Stranger
Friend or acquaintance
32%
29%
8%
31%
Criminal, 
business or 
other 
relationship
Human trafficking often involves victims and witnesses in vulnerable situations who are fearful 
or distrustful of authorities or who are facing threats from the traffickers. This means that
the true scope of human trafficking in Canada is underestimated.
Almost all human 
trafficking victims are 
women and girls 
Number of 
police-reported incidents 
of human trafficking
Percentage of incidents 
involving international 
trafficking 
Percentage of 
police-reported incidents 
in major cities
www.statcan.gc.ca
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, 
Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.
IN CANADA, 2009 to 2018
POLICE-REPORTED
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
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Sign-up Now
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receiving the In Service: 10-8 
newsletter by email. You can sign up 
by clicking here. This will take you to 
the free Subscription Form that only 
requires an email. 
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